@astrojs/cloudflare is an SSR adapter for use with Cloudflare Workers targets. Prior to 13.1.10, the fetch() call for remote images in packages/integrations/cloudflare/src/utils/image-binding-transform.ts uses the default redirect: 'follow' behavior. This allows the Cloudflare Worker to follow HTTP redirects to arbitrary URLs, bypassing the isRemoteAllowed() domain allowlist check which only validates the initial URL. This vulnerabiity is caused by an incomplete fix for CVE-2025-58179. This vulnerability is fixed in 13.1.10.

Affected: npm: @astrojs/cloudflare

## Summary

The `fetch()` call for remote images in `packages/integrations/cloudflare/src/utils/image-binding-transform.ts` (line 28) uses the default `redirect: 'follow'` behavior. This allows the Cloudflare Worker to follow HTTP redirects to arbitrary URLs, bypassing the `isRemoteAllowed()` domain allowlist check which only validates the initial URL.

All three other image fetch paths in the codebase correctly use `{ redirect: 'manual' }`. This is an incomplete fix for GHSA-qpr4-c339-7vq8.

Confirmed on HEAD.

## Root Cause

`image-binding-transform.ts` line 28:

const content = await (isRemotePath(href) ? fetch(imageSrc) : assets.fetch(imageSrc));

Missing `{ redirect: 'manual' }`. The three protected paths:

// image-passthrough-endpoint.ts:23 response = await fetch(href, { redirect: 'manual' });

// assets/endpoint/shared.ts:11 const res = await fetch(src, { redirect: 'manual' });

// assets/utils/remoteProbe.ts:53 const response = await fetch(url, { redirect: 'manual' });

## PoC

Demonstrated with Node.js that `fetch()` without `redirect: 'manual'` follows 302 redirects to arbitrary destinations:

# Server A (allowed domain) returns 302 → Server B (internal) fetch('http://allowed:19741/img.jpg') → follows 302 → hits http://internal:19742/secret fetch('http://allowed:19741/img.jpg', {redirect:'manual'}) → returns 302, internal server NOT hit

Attack path: attacker finds an open redirect on an allowed doma…