https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-17T02:56:06.323403+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292752 EUVD-2026-292752 2026-10-17T02:56:06.325799+00:00 EUVD-2026-292752 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-41180 fkie_cve-2026-41180 2026-10-17T02:56:06.325830+00:00

PsiTransfer is an open source, self-hosted file sharing solution. Prior to version 2.4.3, the upload PATCH flow under `/files/:uploadId` validates the mounted request path using the still-encoded `req.path`, but the downstream tus handler later writes using the decoded `req.params.uploadId`. In deployments that use a supported custom `PSITRANSFER_UPLOAD_DIR` whose basename prefixes a startup-loaded JavaScript path, such as `conf`, an unauthenticated attacker can create `config.<NODE_ENV>.js` in the application root. The attacker-controlled file is then executed on the next process restart. Version 2.4.3 contains a patch.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-533q-w4g6-5586 GHSA-533q-w4g6-5586 — PsiTransfer: Upload PATCH path traversal can create `config.<NODE_ENV>.js` and lead to code execution on restart 2026-10-17T02:56:06.325863+00:00

Affected: npm: psitransfer

### Summary

The upload PATCH flow under `/files/:uploadId` validates the mounted request path using the still-encoded `req.path`, but the downstream tus handler later writes using the decoded `req.params.uploadId`. In deployments that use a supported custom `PSITRANSFER_UPLOAD_DIR` whose basename prefixes a startup-loaded JavaScript path, such as `conf`, an unauthenticated attacker can create `config.<NODE_ENV>.js` in the application root. The attacker-controlled file is then executed on the next process restart.

### Details

Observed in `2.4.1`, the upload middleware derives `fid` from `req.path.substring(1)` and calls `store.info(fid)` before handing the request to tus. For a request such as `/files/..%2Fconfig.production.js`, this outer check sees the encoded value `..%2Fconfig.production.js`. The downstream `patch('/:uploadId')` route, however, receives the decoded parameter `../config.production.js`. In the same code path, the `catch` branch uses `if(! e instanceof httpErrors.NotFound)`, which does not correctly stop execution on a missing upload target.

The write sink is `Store.getFilename(fid)`, which resolves `path.resolve(uploadDir, fid.replace('++', '/'))` and then only checks `startsWith(uploadDir)`. With a supported custom upload directory such as `<app_root>/conf`, the decoded target `../config.production.js` resolves to `<app_root>/config.production.js`, and the current string-prefix jail check still accepts it because the resolved path begins with `<app_roo…