WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 29.0 and below, the `isSSRFSafeURL()` function in `objects/functions.php` contains a same-domain shortcircuit (lines 4290-4296) that allows any URL whose hostname matches `webSiteRootURL` to bypass all SSRF protections. Because the check compares only the hostname and ignores the port, an attacker can reach arbitrary ports on the AVideo server by using the site's public hostname with a non-standard port. The response body is saved to a web-accessible path, enabling full exfiltration. Commit a0156a6398362086390d949190f9d52a823000ba fixes the issue.

Affected: Packagist: wwbn/avideo

## Summary

The `isSSRFSafeURL()` function in `objects/functions.php` contains a same-domain shortcircuit (lines 4290-4296) that allows any URL whose hostname matches `webSiteRootURL` to bypass all SSRF protections. Because the check compares only the hostname and ignores the port, an attacker can reach arbitrary ports on the AVideo server by using the site's public hostname with a non-standard port. The response body is saved to a web-accessible path, enabling full exfiltration.

## Details

Commit `40872e529` fixed an extension-based SSRF bypass by making `isSSRFSafeURL()` unconditional. However, `isSSRFSafeURL()` itself contains a same-domain shortcircuit that returns `true` when the URL's hostname matches `webSiteRootURL`'s hostname, without validating the port:

```php // objects/functions.php:4290-4296 if (!empty($global['webSiteRootURL'])) { $siteHost = strtolower(parse_url($global['webSiteRootURL'], PHP_URL_HOST)); if ($host === $siteHost) { _error_log("isSSRFSafeURL: allowing same-domain request to {$host} (matches webSiteRootURL)"); return true; // Returns immediately — port, path, scheme all unchecked } } ```

The attack flow through `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php`:

1. User-supplied `$_REQUEST['downloadURL']` is passed to `downloadVideoFromDownloadURL()` at line 166 2. `isSSRFSafeURL()` is called at line 368 — passes due to hostname match 3. `url_get_contents($downloadURL)` fetches the attacker-controlled URL at line 378 4. Response…