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EUVD-2026-291419

2026-10-06T04:25:41.609857+00:00

EUVD-2026-291419

fkie_cve-2026-40159

2026-10-06T04:25:41.609895+00:00

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 4.5.128, PraisonAI’s MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration allows spawning background servers via stdio using user-supplied command strings (e.g., MCP("npx -y @smithery/cli ...")). These commands are executed through Python’s subprocess module. By default, the implementation forwards the entire parent process environment to the spawned subprocess. As a result, any MCP command executed in this manner inherits all environment variables from the host process, including sensitive data such as API keys, authentication tokens, and database credentials. This behavior introduces a security risk when untrusted or third-party commands are used. In common scenarios where MCP tools are invoked via package runners such as npx -y, arbitrary code from external or potentially compromised packages may execute with access to these inherited environment variables. This creates a risk of unintended credential exposure and enables potential supply chain attacks through silent exfiltration of secrets. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.5.128.

GHSA-pj2r-f9mw-vrcq — PraisonAI Vulnerable to Sensitive Environment Variable Exposure via Untrusted MCP Subprocess Execution

2026-10-06T04:25:41.609938+00:00

Affected: PyPI: PraisonAI

PraisonAI’s MCP (Model Context Protocol) integration allows spawning background servers via stdio using user-supplied command strings (e.g., `MCP("npx -y @smithery/cli ...")`). These commands are executed through Python’s `subprocess` module. By default, the implementation **forwards the entire parent process environment** to the spawned subprocess:

```python # src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp.py env = kwargs.get('env', {}) if not env: env = os.environ.copy() ```

As a result, any MCP command executed in this manner inherits all environment variables from the host process, including sensitive data such as API keys, authentication tokens, and database credentials.

This behavior introduces a security risk when untrusted or third-party commands are used. In common scenarios where MCP tools are invoked via package runners such as `npx -y`, arbitrary code from external or potentially compromised packages may execute with access to these inherited environment variables. This creates a risk of unintended credential exposure and enables potential supply chain attacks through silent exfiltration of secrets.

## Reproducing the Attack 1. Export a secret key: `export SUPER_SECRET_KEY=123456_pwned` 2. Start an MCP tool locally that dumps its inherited environment: ```python from praisonaiagents.mcp import MCP # The underlying MCP library spawns this command via subprocess and it dumps the variables mcp = MCP('python -c "import os, json; print(json.dumps(dict(os.enviro…

PYSEC-2026-2918 — PraisonAI Vulnerable to Sensitive Environment Variable Exposure via Untrusted MCP Subprocess Execution

2026-10-06T04:25:41.609990+00:00

Affected: PyPI: praisonai

```python # src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp.py env = kwargs.get('env', {}) if not env: env = os.environ.copy() ```