PraisonAIAgents is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to 1.5.128, he memory hooks executor in praisonaiagents passes a user-controlled command string directly to subprocess.run() with shell=True at src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py. No sanitization is performed and shell metacharacters are interpreted by /bin/sh before the intended command executes. Two independent attack surfaces exist. The first is via pre_run_command and post_run_command hook event types registered through the hooks configuration. The second and more severe surface is the .praisonai/hooks.json lifecycle configuration, where hooks registered for events such as BEFORE_TOOL and AFTER_TOOL fire automatically during agent operation. An agent that gains file-write access through prompt injection can overwrite .praisonai/hooks.json and have its payload execute silently at every subsequent lifecycle event without further user interaction. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.128.

Affected: PyPI: praisonaiagents

Summary

The memory hooks executor in praisonaiagents passes a user-controlled command string directly to subprocess.run() with shell=True at src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py lines 303 to 305. No sanitization, no shlex.quote(), no character filter, and no allowlist check exists anywhere in this file. Shell metacharacters including semicolons, pipes, ampersands, backticks, dollar-sign substitutions, and newlines are interpreted by /bin/sh before the intended command executes.

Two independent attack surfaces exist. The first is via pre_run_command and post_run_command hook event types registered through the hooks configuration. The second and more severe surface is the .praisonai/hooks.json lifecycle configuration, where hooks registered for events such as BEFORE_TOOL and AFTER_TOOL fire automatically during agent operation. An agent that gains file-write access through prompt injection can overwrite .praisonai/hooks.json and have its payload execute silently at every subsequent lifecycle event without further user interaction.

This file and these surfaces are not covered by any existing published advisory.

Vulnerability Description

File : src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py Lines : 303 to 305

Vulnerable code:

result = subprocess.run( command, shell=True, cwd=str(self.workspace_path), env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=hook.timeout )

The variable comm…

Affected: PyPI: praisonaiagents

Summary

The memory hooks executor in praisonaiagents passes a user-controlled command string directly to subprocess.run() with shell=True at src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py lines 303 to 305. No sanitization, no shlex.quote(), no character filter, and no allowlist check exists anywhere in this file. Shell metacharacters including semicolons, pipes, ampersands, backticks, dollar-sign substitutions, and newlines are interpreted by /bin/sh before the intended command executes.

Two independent attack surfaces exist. The first is via pre_run_command and post_run_command hook event types registered through the hooks configuration. The second and more severe surface is the .praisonai/hooks.json lifecycle configuration, where hooks registered for events such as BEFORE_TOOL and AFTER_TOOL fire automatically during agent operation. An agent that gains file-write access through prompt injection can overwrite .praisonai/hooks.json and have its payload execute silently at every subsequent lifecycle event without further user interaction.

This file and these surfaces are not covered by any existing published advisory.

Vulnerability Description

File : src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/memory/hooks.py Lines : 303 to 305

Vulnerable code:

result = subprocess.run( command, shell=True, cwd=str(self.workspace_path), env=env, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=hook.timeout )

The variable c…