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EUVD-2026-291457

2026-10-17T16:23:41.149316+00:00

EUVD-2026-291457

fkie_cve-2026-40090

2026-10-17T16:23:41.149353+00:00

Zarf is an Airgap Native Packager Manager for Kubernetes. Versions 0.23.0 through 0.74.1 contain an arbitrary file write vulnerability in the zarf package inspect sbom and zarf package inspect documentation subcommands. These subcommands output file paths are constructed by joining a user-controlled output directory with the package's Metadata.Name field read directly from the untrusted package's zarf.yaml manifest. Although Metadata.Name is validated against a regex on package creation, an attacker can unarchive a package to modify the Metadata.Name field to contain path traversal sequences such as ../../etc/cron.d/malicious or absolute paths like /home/user/.ssh/authorized_keys, along with the corresponding files inside SBOMS.tar. This allows writing attacker-controlled content to arbitrary filesystem locations within the permissions of the user running the inspect command. This issue has been fixed in version 0.74.2.

GHSA-pj97-4p9w-gx3q — Zarf has a Path Traversal via Malicious Package Metadata.Name — Arbitrary File Write

2026-10-17T16:23:41.149390+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/zarf-dev/zarf

### Impact This vulnerability impacts users of `zarf package inspect sbom` or `zarf package inspect documentation` on untrusted packages.

### Patches #4793, now fixed in version v0.74.2

### Workarounds Avoid inspecting unsigned packages

## Description

The `package inspect sbom` and `package inspect documentation` subcommands construct output file paths by joining a user-controlled output directory with the package's `Metadata.Name` field, which is attacker-controlled data read from the package archive. The `Metadata.Name` field is validated against a regex on create, `^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9\-]*$`, however a malicious user could unarchive a package to change the `.Metadata.Name` field and the files inside the SBOMS.tar. This would lead to arbitrary file write in a location of the attackers choosing.

Neither location sanitizes or validates the package name before using it in the file path.

**SBOM inspection:** ```go outputPath := filepath.Join(o.outputDir, pkgLayout.Pkg.Metadata.Name) err = pkgLayout.GetSBOM(ctx, outputPath) ```

**Documentation inspection (line 1219):** ```go outputPath := filepath.Join(o.outputDir, fmt.Sprintf("%s-documentation", pkgLayout.Pkg.Metadata.Name)) return pkgLayout.GetDocumentation(ctx, outputPath, o.keys) ```

`pkgLayout.Pkg.Metadata.Name` is read directly from the untrusted package's `zarf.yaml` manifest. An attacker can craft a malicious Zarf package where `Metadata.Name` contains path traversal sequences or root paths such as `../../etc/cron…