WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 26.0 and prior, objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php allowed an authenticated uploader to fetch attacker-controlled same-origin /videos/... URLs, bypass traversal scrubbing, and expose server-local files through the GIF poster storage path. The vulnerable GIF branch could be abused to read local files such as /etc/passwd or application source files and republish those bytes through a normal public GIF media URL.

Affected: Packagist: WWBN/AVideo

## Summary

`objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` allowed an authenticated uploader to fetch attacker-controlled same-origin `/videos/...` URLs, bypass traversal scrubbing, and expose server-local files through the GIF poster storage path.

The vulnerable GIF branch could be abused to read local files such as `/etc/passwd` or application source files and republish those bytes through a normal public GIF media URL.

## Details

The vulnerable chain was:

1. `objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php` accepted attacker-controlled `downloadURL_gifimage` 2. traversal scrubbing used `str_replace('../', '', ...)`, which was bypassable with overlapping input such as `....//` 3. same-origin `/videos/...` URLs were accepted 4. `url_get_contents()` and `try_get_contents_from_local()` resolved the request into a local filesystem read 5. the fetched bytes were written into the GIF destination 6. invalid GIF cleanup used the wrong variable, so the non-image payload remained on disk

This made the GIF poster path a local file disclosure primitive with public retrieval.

## Proof of concept

1. Log in as an uploader and create an owned video row through the normal encoder flow. 2. Send:

```text POST /objects/aVideoEncoderReceiveImage.json.php downloadURL_gifimage=https://localhost/videos/....//....//....//....//....//....//etc/passwd ```

3. Query:

```text GET /objects/videos.json.php?showAll=1 ```

4. Recover the generated GIF URL from `videosURL.gif.url`. 5. Download that GIF U…