mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. From 2026.2.18 through 2026.4.5, mise loads trust-control settings from a local project .mise.toml before the trust check runs. An attacker who can place a malicious .mise.toml in a repository can make that same file appear trusted and then reach dangerous directives such as [env] _.source, templates, hooks, or tasks.

Affected: crates.io: mise

### Summary

`mise` loads trust-control settings from a local project `.mise.toml` before the trust check runs. An attacker who can place a malicious `.mise.toml` in a repository can make that same file appear trusted and then reach dangerous directives such as `[env] _.source`, templates, hooks, or tasks.

The strongest current variant is `trusted_config_paths = ["/"]`. I confirmed on current `v2026.3.17` in Docker that this causes an untrusted project config to become trusted during `mise hook-env`, which then executes an attacker-controlled `_.source` script. The same preload issue also lets local `yes = true` / `ci = true` auto-approve trust prompts on `v2026.2.18+`, but the primary PoC below uses the stronger `trusted_config_paths` path.

### Details

The vulnerable load order is:

1. [`Settings::try_get()`](https://github.com/jdx/mise/blob/37997e70cd2216d1a86726fba0c8c09c3986ad06/src/config/settings.rs#L254-L283) preloads local settings files. 2. [`parse_settings_file()`](https://github.com/jdx/mise/blob/37997e70cd2216d1a86726fba0c8c09c3986ad06/src/config/settings.rs#L505-L510) returns `settings_file.settings` without checking whether the file is trusted. 3. [`trust_check()`](https://github.com/jdx/mise/blob/37997e70cd2216d1a86726fba0c8c09c3986ad06/src/config/config_file/mod.rs#L297-L321) later consults those already-loaded settings.

The main trust-bypass path is in [`is_trusted()`](https://github.com/jdx/mise/blob/37997e70cd2216d1a86726fba0c8c09c3986ad06/src/config/c…