WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 26.0 and prior, the install/test.php diagnostic script has its CLI-only access guard disabled by commenting out the die() statement. The script remains accessible via HTTP after installation, exposing video viewer statistics including IP addresses, session IDs, and user agents to unauthenticated visitors.

Affected: Packagist: wwbn/avideo

## Summary

The `install/test.php` diagnostic script has its CLI-only access guard disabled by commenting out the `die()` statement. The script remains accessible via HTTP after installation, exposing video viewer statistics including IP addresses, session IDs, and user agents to unauthenticated visitors.

## Details

The disabled guard at `install/test.php:5-7`:

```php if (!isCommandLineInterface()) { //return die('Command Line only'); } ```

The script also enables verbose error reporting:

```php error_reporting(E_ALL); ini_set('display_errors', '1'); ```

It then queries `VideoStatistic::getLastStatistics()` and outputs the result via `var_dump()`:

```php $resp = VideoStatistic::getLastStatistics(getVideos_id(), User::getId()); var_dump($resp); ```

The `VideoStatistic` object contains: `ip` (viewer IP address), `session_id`, `user_agent`, `users_id`, and JSON metadata. The `display_errors=1` setting also leaks internal filesystem paths in any PHP warnings.

The `install/` directory is not restricted by `.htaccess` (it only disables directory listing via `Options -Indexes`) and no web server rules block access to individual PHP files in this directory.

## Proof of Concept

```bash # Request viewer stats for video ID 1 curl "https://your-avideo-instance.com/install/test.php?videos_id=1" ```

Confirmed accessible on live AVideo instances (HTTP 200).

## Impact

Unauthenticated disclosure of viewer IP addresses (PII under GDPR), session identifiers, and user agents.…