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  <updated>2026-10-13T02:35:40.926972+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-281011</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-281011</title>
    <updated>2026-10-13T02:35:40.986961+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-281011</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-281011"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-35036</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-35036</title>
    <updated>2026-10-13T02:35:40.986995+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Ech0 is an open-source, self-hosted publishing platform for personal idea sharing. Prior to 4.2.8, Ech0 implements link preview (editor fetches a page title) through GET /api/website/title. That is legitimate product behavior, but the implementation is unsafe: the route is unauthenticated, accepts a fully attacker-controlled URL, performs a server-side GET, reads the entire response body into memory (io.ReadAll). There is no host allowlist, no SSRF filter, and InsecureSkipVerify: true on the outbound client. Anyone who can reach the instance can force the Ech0 server to open HTTP/HTTPS URLs of their choice as seen from the server’s network position (Docker bridge, VPC, localhost from the process view). This vulnerability is fixed in 4.2.8.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-35036"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wc4h-2348-jc3p</id>
    <title>GHSA-wc4h-2348-jc3p — Ech0 has Unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in Website Preview Feature</title>
    <updated>2026-10-13T02:35:40.987033+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/lin-snow/ech0</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>Ech0 implements **link preview** (editor fetches a page title) through **`GET /api/website/title`**. That is **legitimate product behavior**, but the implementation is **unsafe**: the route is **unauthenticated**, accepts a **fully attacker-controlled URL**, performs a **server-side GET**, reads the **entire response body** into memory (`io.ReadAll`). There is **no** host allowlist, **no** SSRF filter, and **`InsecureSkipVerify: true`** on the outbound client.</p>
<p>**Attacker outcome :** Anyone who can reach the instance can **force the Ech0 server** to open **HTTP/HTTPS URLs of their choice** as seen from the **server’s network position** (Docker bridge, VPC, localhost from the process view). 
Go’s default `http.Client` **follows redirects** (unless disabled). Redirect chains can move the server-side request from an allowed-looking host to an internal target; the code does not disable this in `SendRequest`.</p>
<p>### Affected Components</p>
<p>**Ech0 codebase:**</p>
<p>- `internal/handler/common/common.go`  
  Handles the `/api/website/title` endpoint and accepts user-controlled URL input.</p>
<p>- `internal/service/common/common.go`  
  Processes the request and invokes the outbound HTTP fetch (`GetWebsiteTitle`).</p>
<p>- `internal/util/http/http.go`  
  Performs the HTTP request (`SendRequest`) with the following insecure configurations:
  - No URL validation or allowlist
  - Redirects enabled (default client behavior)
  - `InsecureSkipVerify: true`</p>
<p>### PoC</p>
<p>**Environment:** Ech0 listenin…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wc4h-2348-jc3p"/>
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