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  <updated>2026-10-05T18:49:14.986514+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-337304</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-337304</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T18:49:14.990907+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-337304</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-337304"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34780</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-34780</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T18:49:14.990954+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Electron is a framework for writing cross-platform desktop applications using JavaScript, HTML and CSS. From versions 39.0.0-alpha.1 to before 39.8.0, 40.0.0-alpha.1 to before 40.7.0, and 41.0.0-alpha.1 to before 41.0.0-beta.8, apps that pass VideoFrame objects (from the WebCodecs API) across the contextBridge are vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. An attacker who can execute JavaScript in the main world (for example, via XSS) can use a bridged VideoFrame to gain access to the isolated world, including any Node.js APIs exposed to the preload script. Apps are only affected if a preload script returns, resolves, or passes a VideoFrame object to the main world via contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld(). Apps that do not bridge VideoFrame objects are not affected. This issue has been patched in versions 39.8.0, 40.7.0, and 41.0.0-beta.8.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34780"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jfqg-hf23-qpw2</id>
    <title>GHSA-jfqg-hf23-qpw2 — Electron: Context Isolation bypass via contextBridge VideoFrame transfer</title>
    <updated>2026-10-05T18:49:14.991004+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: electron</p>
<p>### Impact
Apps that pass `VideoFrame` objects (from the WebCodecs API) across the `contextBridge` are vulnerable to a context isolation bypass. An attacker who can execute JavaScript in the main world (for example, via XSS) can use a bridged `VideoFrame` to gain access to the isolated world, including any Node.js APIs exposed to the preload script.</p>
<p>Apps are only affected if a preload script returns, resolves, or passes a `VideoFrame` object to the main world via `contextBridge.exposeInMainWorld()`. Apps that do not bridge `VideoFrame` objects are not affected.</p>
<p>### Workarounds
Do not pass `VideoFrame` objects across `contextBridge`. If an app needs to transfer video frame data, serialize it to an `ArrayBuffer` or `ImageBitmap` before bridging.</p>
<p>### Fixed Versions
* `41.0.0-beta.8`
* `40.7.0`
* `39.8.0`</p>
<p>### For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please email [security@electronjs.org](mailto:security@electronjs.org)</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-jfqg-hf23-qpw2"/>
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