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  <updated>2026-10-06T04:06:02.089147+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-290879</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-290879</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T04:06:02.139994+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-290879</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-290879"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34727</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-34727</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T04:06:02.140039+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.3.0, the OIDC callback handler issues a full JWT token without checking whether the matched user has TOTP two-factor authentication enabled. When a local user with TOTP enrolled is matched via the OIDC email fallback mechanism, the second factor is completely skipped. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.3.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34727"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8jvc-mcx6-r4cg</id>
    <title>GHSA-8jvc-mcx6-r4cg — Vikunja has TOTP Two-Factor Authentication Bypass via OIDC Login Path</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T04:06:02.140078+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: code.vikunja.io/api</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The OIDC callback handler issues a full JWT token without checking whether the matched user has TOTP two-factor authentication enabled. When a local user with TOTP enrolled is matched via the OIDC email fallback mechanism, the second factor is completely skipped.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>The OIDC callback at `pkg/modules/auth/openid/openid.go:185` issues a JWT directly after user lookup:</p>
<p>```go
return auth.NewUserAuthTokenResponse(u, c, false)
```</p>
<p>There are zero references to TOTP in the entire `pkg/modules/auth/openid/` directory. By contrast, the local login handler at `pkg/routes/api/v1/login.go:79-102` correctly implements TOTP verification:</p>
<p>```go
totpEnabled, err := user2.TOTPEnabledForUser(s, user)
if totpEnabled {
    if u.TOTPPasscode == "" {
        _ = s.Rollback()
        return user2.ErrInvalidTOTPPasscode{}
    }
    _, err = user2.ValidateTOTPPasscode(s, &amp;user2.TOTPPasscode{
        User:     user,
        Passcode: u.TOTPPasscode,
    })
```</p>
<p>When OIDC `EmailFallback` maps to a local user who has TOTP enabled, the TOTP enrollment is ignored and a full JWT is issued without any second-factor challenge.</p>
<p>## Proof of Concept</p>
<p>Tested on Vikunja v2.2.2 with Dex as the OIDC provider.</p>
<p>Setup:
- Vikunja configured with `emailfallback: true` for Dex
- Local user `alice` (id=1) has TOTP enabled</p>
<p>```python
import requests, re, html
from urllib.parse import parse_qs, urlparse</p>
<p>TARGET = "http://localhost:3456"
DEX = "http://localhost:5556"
API = f"{TARGET}/api/v1"</p>
<p># ver…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8jvc-mcx6-r4cg"/>
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