SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to version 3.6.2, an attacker who can place a malicious URL in an Attribute View mAsse field can trigger stored XSS when a victim opens the Gallery or Kanban view with “Cover From -> Asset Field” enabled. The vulnerable code accepts arbitrary http(s) URLs without extensions as images, stores the attacker-controlled string in coverURL, and injects it directly into an <img src="..."> attribute without escaping. In the Electron desktop client, the injected JavaScript executes with nodeIntegration enabled and contextIsolation disabled, so the XSS reaches arbitrary OS command execution under the victim’s account. This issue has been patched in version 3.6.2.

Affected: Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

### Summary An attacker who can place a malicious URL in an Attribute View `mAsse` field can trigger stored XSS when a victim opens the Gallery or Kanban view with “Cover From -> Asset Field” enabled. The vulnerable code accepts arbitrary `http(s)` URLs without extensions as images, stores the attacker-controlled string in `coverURL`, and injects it directly into an `<img src="...">` attribute without escaping. In the Electron desktop client, the injected JavaScript executes with `nodeIntegration` enabled and `contextIsolation` disabled, so the XSS reaches arbitrary OS command execution under the victim’s account.

### Details The vulnerable flow is:

1. `IsPossiblyImage(assetPath)` accepts arbitrary `http(s)` URLs without validating that they are safe image URLs. 2. When an Attribute View card uses `Cover From -> Asset Field`, the application copies `asset.Content` directly into `galleryCard.CoverURL / kanbanCard.CoverURL`. 3. The front-end renderer inserts `coverURL` directly into `<img src="${getCompressURL(item.coverURL)}">` without escaping quotes or other attribute-breaking characters. 4. A payload such as `https://example.com/" onerror="require('child_process').exec('calc')` breaks out of the `src` attribute and adds an attacker-controlled `onerror` handler. When the image fails to load, the injected JavaScript runs in the Electron renderer. Because the desktop app enables `nodeIntegration: true` and disables `contextIsolation` and `webSecurity`, that JavaScript can a…