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  <updated>2026-10-06T17:45:39.810185+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-278308</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-278308</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T17:45:39.869162+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-278308</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-278308"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34377</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-34377</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T17:45:39.869204+00:00</updated>
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        <p>ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.1, a logic error in Zebra's transaction verification cache could allow a malicious miner to induce a consensus split. By matching a valid transaction's txid while providing invalid authorization data, a miner could cause vulnerable Zebra nodes to accept an invalid block, leading to a consensus split from the rest of the Zcash network. This would not allow invalid transactions to be accepted but could result in a consensus split between vulnerable Zebra nodes and invulnerable Zebra and Zcashd nodes. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.0 and zebra-consensus version 5.0.1.</p>
      </div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34377"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3vmh-33xr-9cqh</id>
    <title>GHSA-3vmh-33xr-9cqh — Zebra has a Consensus Failure due to Improper Verification of V5 Transactions</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T17:45:39.869243+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> crates.io: zebrad, crates.io: zebra-consensus</p>
<p>---</p>
<p># CVE-2026-34377: Consensus Failure via Crafted V5 Authorization Data</p>
<p>## Summary
A logic error in Zebra's transaction verification cache could allow a malicious miner to induce a consensus split. By matching a valid transaction's `txid` while providing invalid authorization data, a miner could cause vulnerable Zebra nodes to accept an invalid block, leading to a consensus split from the rest of the Zcash network.  To be clear, **this would not allow invalid transactions to be accepted** but could result in a consensus split between vulnerable Zebra nodes and invulnerable Zebra and Zcashd nodes.</p>
<p>## Severity
**High** - This is a Consensus Vulnerability that could allow a malicious miner to induce network partitioning, service disruption, and potential double-spend attacks against affected nodes.</p>
<p>## Affected Versions
All Zebra versions supporting V5 transactions (Network Upgrade 5 and later) prior to **version 4.3.0**.</p>
<p>## Description
The vulnerability exists in the `find_verified_unmined_tx` function within `transaction.rs`. This function was designed to optimize block verification by checking if a transaction was already verified in the mempool.</p>
<p>The lookup mechanism used the **ZIP-244 `txid`** as the unique key. However, for V5 transactions, the `txid` specifically excludes the **Authorization Data Root** (signatures and proofs). Because Zebra returned a "verified" status based solely on the `txid`, it skipped the essential `check_v5_auth()` call for the transaction…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3vmh-33xr-9cqh"/>
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