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  <updated>2026-10-07T01:16:36.716984+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-278837</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-278837</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T01:16:36.719555+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-278837</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-278837"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34083</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-34083</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T01:16:36.719598+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Signal K Server is a server application that runs on a central hub in a boat. Prior to version 2.24.0, SignalK Server contains a code-level vulnerability in its OIDC login and logout handlers where the unvalidated HTTP Host header is used to construct the OAuth2 redirect_uri. Because the redirectUri configuration is silently unset by default, an attacker can spoof the Host header to steal OAuth authorization codes and hijack user sessions in realistic deployments as The OIDC provider will then send the authorization code to whatever domain was injected. This issue has been patched in version 2.24.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-34083"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cxj8-ggf2-p57c</id>
    <title>GHSA-cxj8-ggf2-p57c — Signal K Server: OAuth Authorization Code Theft via Unvalidated Host Header in OIDC Flow</title>
    <updated>2026-10-07T01:16:36.719632+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: signalk-server</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>SignalK Server contains a code-level vulnerability in its OIDC login and logout handlers where the unvalidated HTTP Host header is used to construct the OAuth2 redirect_uri. Because the redirectUri configuration is silently unset by default, an **attacker spoof the Host header** to steal OAuth authorization codes and hijack user sessions in realistic deployments as The OIDC provider will then send the authorization code to whatever domain was injected.</p>
<p>_The OIDC specification requires redirect_uri to be pre-registered and not derived from untrusted input. Constructing it from the Host header violates this requirement and introduces a trust boundary break._
This risk is actively amplified by SignalK's official documentation, which instructs administrators to deploy an Nginx configuration that forwards the vulnerable Host header, exposing production environments.</p>
<p>## Vulnerability Root Cause</p>
<p>Two factors combine to create this vulnerability:</p>
<p>**Factor 1: redirectUri is optional with an unsafe fallback**
In types.ts:30, redirectUri is declared as optional
```
export interface OIDCConfig {
  // ...
  redirectUri?: string   // ← Optional, no default value
  // ...
}
```</p>
<p>The defaults in types.ts:175-185 do not include a redirectUri: never checks or warns about a missing redirectUri. This means a fully "valid" OIDC configuration can exist without redirectUri, silently activating the vulnerable fallback path.
```
export const OIDC_DEFAULTS: Omit&lt;OIDCConfig, 'issuer' |…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cxj8-ggf2-p57c"/>
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