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  <updated>2026-10-12T11:00:56.238400+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277214</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-277214</title>
    <updated>2026-10-12T11:00:56.281955+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-277214</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277214"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33717</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-33717</title>
    <updated>2026-10-12T11:00:56.281989+00:00</updated>
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        <p>WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `downloadVideoFromDownloadURL()` function in `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` saves remote content to a web-accessible temporary directory using the original URL's filename and extension (including `.php`). By providing an invalid `resolution` parameter, an attacker triggers an early `die()` via `forbiddenPage()` before the temp file can be moved or cleaned up, leaving an executable PHP file persistently accessible under the web root at `videos/cache/tmpFile/`. Commit 6da79b43484099a0b660d1544a63c07b633ed3a2 contains a patch.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33717"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8wf4-c4x3-h952</id>
    <title>GHSA-8wf4-c4x3-h952 — AVideo: Remote Code Execution via PHP Temp File in Encoder downloadURL</title>
    <updated>2026-10-12T11:00:56.282024+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: wwbn/avideo</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The `downloadVideoFromDownloadURL()` function in `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` saves remote content to a web-accessible temporary directory using the original URL's filename and extension (including `.php`). By providing an invalid `resolution` parameter, an attacker triggers an early `die()` via `forbiddenPage()` before the temp file can be moved or cleaned up, leaving an executable PHP file persistently accessible under the web root at `videos/cache/tmpFile/`.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>The vulnerability is a race-free file upload leading to RCE, exploiting a logic flaw in the error handling order of operations.</p>
<p>**Step 1 — File download preserves dangerous extension:**</p>
<p>In `objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php`, when a `downloadURL` parameter is provided, the file is downloaded and saved with the URL's original basename:</p>
<p>```php
// objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php:361-365
$_FILES['video']['name'] = basename($downloadURL);  // preserves .php extension
$temp = Video::getStoragePath() . "cache/tmpFile/" . $_FILES['video']['name'];
make_path($temp);
$bytesSaved = file_put_contents($temp, $file);
```</p>
<p>The `format` parameter (validated against `$global['allowedExtension']` at line 42) is only used later for the *final* destination filename (line 238), not for the temp file. The temp file uses `basename($downloadURL)` directly, allowing any extension including `.php`.</p>
<p>**Step 2 — Resolution validation aborts after file write:**</p>
<p>After the file is downloaded and written to disk (line 15…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-8wf4-c4x3-h952"/>
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