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  <updated>2026-10-17T18:04:26.584956+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277136</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-277136</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T18:04:26.632807+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-277136</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277136"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33651</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-33651</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T18:04:26.632842+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, the `remindMe.json.php` endpoint passes `$_REQUEST['live_schedule_id']` through multiple functions without sanitization until it reaches `Scheduler_commands::getAllActiveOrToRepeat()`, which directly concatenates it into a SQL `LIKE` clause. Although intermediate functions (`new Live_schedule()`, `getUsers_idOrCompany()`) apply `intval()` internally, they do so on local copies within `ObjectYPT::getFromDb()`, leaving the original tainted variable unchanged. Any authenticated user can perform time-based blind SQL injection to extract arbitrary database contents. Commit 75d45780728294ededa1e3f842f95295d3e7d144 contains a patch.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33651"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pvw4-p2jm-chjm</id>
    <title>GHSA-pvw4-p2jm-chjm — AVideo has a Blind SQL Injection in Live Schedule Reminder via Unsanitized live_schedule_id in Scheduler_commands::getA…</title>
    <updated>2026-10-17T18:04:26.632877+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: wwbn/avideo</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>The `remindMe.json.php` endpoint passes `$_REQUEST['live_schedule_id']` through multiple functions without sanitization until it reaches `Scheduler_commands::getAllActiveOrToRepeat()`, which directly concatenates it into a SQL `LIKE` clause. Although intermediate functions (`new Live_schedule()`, `getUsers_idOrCompany()`) apply `intval()` internally, they do so on local copies within `ObjectYPT::getFromDb()`, leaving the original tainted variable unchanged. Any authenticated user can perform time-based blind SQL injection to extract arbitrary database contents.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>The vulnerability involves a 6-step data flow from user input to an unsanitized SQL sink:</p>
<p>**Step 1 — User input (no sanitization):**
`plugin/Live/remindMe.json.php:15`:
```php
$reminder = Live::setLiveScheduleReminder($_REQUEST['live_schedule_id'], ...);
```</p>
<p>**Step 2 — Auth check passes for any user:**
`plugin/Live/Live.php:4126`:
```php
if (!User::isLogged()) {
    $obj-&gt;msg = __('Must be logged');
    return $obj;
}
```</p>
<p>**Step 3 — intval() applied only internally, original variable unchanged:**
`plugin/Live/Live.php:4141-4143`:
```php
$ls = new Live_schedule($live_schedule_id);  // intval() inside getFromDb() only
$users_id = Live_schedule::getUsers_idOrCompany($live_schedule_id);  // same
```</p>
<p>`objects/Object.php:84` (inside `getFromDb()`):
```php
$id = intval($id);  // sanitizes the LOCAL parameter, not the caller's variable
```</p>
<p>With input like `1" AND SLEEP(5) --`, `intval()` extracts…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pvw4-p2jm-chjm"/>
  </entry>
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