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EUVD-2026-277394

2026-10-07T14:04:02.271715+00:00

EUVD-2026-277394

fkie_cve-2026-33354

2026-10-07T14:04:02.271751+00:00

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions up to and including 26.0, `POST /objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` accepts a requester-controlled `chunkFile` parameter intended for staged upload chunks. Instead of restricting that path to trusted server-generated chunk locations, the endpoint accepts arbitrary local filesystem paths that pass `isValidURLOrPath()`. That helper allows files under broad server directories including `/var/www/`, the application root, cache, tmp, and `videos`, only rejecting `.php` files. For an authenticated uploader editing their own video, this becomes an arbitrary local file read. The endpoint copies the attacker-chosen local file into the attacker's public video storage path, after which it can be downloaded over HTTP. Commit 59bbd601a3f65a5b18c1d9e4eb11471c0a59214f contains a patch for the issue.

GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6 — AVideo has an authenticated arbitrary local file read via `chunkFile` path injection in `aVideoEncoder.json.php`

2026-10-07T14:04:02.271789+00:00

Affected: Packagist: wwbn/avideo

## Summary `POST /objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` accepts a requester-controlled `chunkFile` parameter intended for staged upload chunks. Instead of restricting that path to trusted server-generated chunk locations, the endpoint accepts arbitrary local filesystem paths that pass `isValidURLOrPath()`. That helper allows files under broad server directories including `/var/www/`, the application root, cache, tmp, and `videos`, only rejecting `.php` files.

For an authenticated uploader editing their own video, this becomes an arbitrary local file read. The endpoint copies the attacker-chosen local file into the attacker's public video storage path, after which it can be downloaded over HTTP.

I confirmed this locally by creating an attacker-owned video, then calling `aVideoEncoder.json.php` with `videos_id=`, `format=mp4`, and `chunkFile=/var/www/html/AVideo/.compose/letsencrypt/live/localhost/privkey.pem`. The resulting public video URL returned the local TLS private key and began with `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----`.

## Affected Versions / Commit Tested on local Docker deployment from commit `db12d4c0141d40bfabd1e82577e8c4a3d044cd84`. The application reported version `26.0`.

## Preconditions - Authenticated account with upload permission. - Attacker owns at least one editable video record. - Target local file is readable by the web application user.

## Steps to Reproduce 1. Log in as an upload-capable low-privileged user. 2. Create any attacker-owned video via th…