https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-06T05:47:21.148545+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277344 EUVD-2026-277344 2026-10-06T05:47:21.203185+00:00 EUVD-2026-277344 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33353 fkie_cve-2026-33353 2026-10-06T05:47:21.203286+00:00

Soft Serve is a self-hostable Git server for the command line. From version 0.6.0 to before version 0.11.6, an authorization flaw in repo import allows any authenticated SSH user to clone a server-local Git repository, including another user's private repo, into a new repository they control. This issue has been patched in version 0.11.6.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xgxp-f695-6vrp GHSA-xgxp-f695-6vrp — In Soft Serve, an authenticated repo import can clone server-local private repositories 2026-10-06T05:47:21.203338+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve

### Summary An authorization flaw in `repo import` allows any authenticated SSH user to clone a server-local Git repository, including another user's private repo, into a new repository they control. This breaks the private-repository confidentiality boundary and should be treated as High severity.

### Details Repo import checks authorization only for the destination repository name, not for the source remote. The destination-side authorization comes from [`pkg/ssh/cmd/cmd.go:172`](https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/blob/main/pkg/ssh/cmd/cmd.go#L172), which calls [`pkg/backend/user.go:46`](https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/blob/main/pkg/backend/user.go#L46). If the destination repo does not already exist, any authenticated user is granted `ReadWriteAccess` at [`pkg/backend/user.go:94`](https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/blob/main/pkg/backend/user.go#L94).

The import command then passes the user-controlled `REMOTE` into [`pkg/backend/repo.go:102`](https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/blob/main/pkg/backend/repo.go#L102). In vulnerable `HEAD`, `git.Clone(remote, rp, copts)` is reached without validating that `remote` is actually a network remote. As a result, a user can supply a server filesystem path such as `$DATA_PATH/repos/secret.git` and cause the server to clone its own local bare repository into a new repo owned by the attacker.

The relevant vulnerable flow is: - [`pkg/ssh/cmd/import.go`](https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/b…