WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, the `uploadVideoToLinkedIn()` method in the SocialMediaPublisher plugin constructs a shell command by directly interpolating an upload URL received from LinkedIn's API response, without sanitization via `escapeshellarg()`. If an attacker can influence the LinkedIn API response (via MITM, compromised OAuth token, or API compromise), they can inject arbitrary OS commands that execute as the web server user. Version 26.0 contains a fix for the issue.

Affected: Packagist: wwbn/avideo

## Summary

The `uploadVideoToLinkedIn()` method in the SocialMediaPublisher plugin constructs a shell command by directly interpolating an upload URL received from LinkedIn's API response, without sanitization via `escapeshellarg()`. If an attacker can influence the LinkedIn API response (via MITM, compromised OAuth token, or API compromise), they can inject arbitrary OS commands that execute as the web server user.

## Details

The vulnerability exists in `plugin/SocialMediaPublisher/Objects/SocialUploader.php`.

The `initializeLinkedInUploadSession()` method (line 649) sends a POST request to `https://api.linkedin.com/rest/videos?action=initializeUpload` and parses the JSON response at line 693:

```php // SocialUploader.php:693 $responseArray = json_decode($response, true); ```

The parsed `uploadInstructions` array is iterated at line 532, and each `uploadUrl` is passed to `uploadVideoToLinkedIn()` at line 542:

```php // SocialUploader.php:542 $uploadResponse = self::uploadVideoToLinkedIn($instruction['uploadUrl'], $tmpFile); ```

The `uploadVideoToLinkedIn()` method (line 711) constructs a shell command by directly concatenating both `$uploadUrl` and `$filePath` into a string passed to `exec()`:

```php // SocialUploader.php:713-720 $shellCmd = 'curl -v -H "Content-Type:application/octet-stream" --upload-file "' . $filePath . '" "' . $uploadUrl . '" 2>&1';

_error_log("Upload Video Shell Command:\n" . $shellCmd);

exec($shellCmd, $o); ```

Neither `$uploadUrl`…