Most recent entries from all

EUVD-2026-290919

2026-10-18T06:56:36.813769+00:00

EUVD-2026-290919

fkie_cve-2026-33237

2026-10-18T06:56:36.813840+00:00

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Prior to version 26.0, the Scheduler plugin's `run()` function in `plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php` calls `url_get_contents()` with an admin-configurable `callbackURL` that is validated only by `isValidURL()` (URL format check). Unlike other AVideo endpoints that were recently patched for SSRF (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw, GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), the Scheduler's callback URL is never passed through `isSSRFSafeURL()`, which blocks requests to RFC-1918 private addresses, loopback, and cloud metadata endpoints. An admin can configure a scheduled task with an internal network `callbackURL` to perform SSRF against cloud infrastructure metadata services or internal APIs not otherwise reachable from the internet. Version 26.0 contains a patch for the issue.

GHSA-v467-g7g7-hhfh — AVideo has SSRF in Scheduler Plugin via callbackURL Missing `isSSRFSafeURL()` Validation

2026-10-18T06:56:36.813875+00:00

Affected: Packagist: wwbn/avideo

## Summary

The Scheduler plugin's `run()` function in `plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php` calls `url_get_contents()` with an admin-configurable `callbackURL` that is validated only by `isValidURL()` (URL format check). Unlike other AVideo endpoints that were recently patched for SSRF (GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw, GHSA-h39h-7cvg-q7j6), the Scheduler's callback URL is never passed through `isSSRFSafeURL()`, which blocks requests to RFC-1918 private addresses, loopback, and cloud metadata endpoints. An admin can configure a scheduled task with an internal network `callbackURL` to perform SSRF against cloud infrastructure metadata services or internal APIs not otherwise reachable from the internet.

## Details

The vulnerable code is at `plugin/Scheduler/Scheduler.php:157-166`:

```php // Line 157: callback URL retrieved and site-root token substituted $callBackURL = $e->getCallbackURL(); $callBackURL = str_replace('$SITE_ROOT_TOKEN', $global['webSiteRootURL'], $callBackURL); if (!isValidURL($callBackURL)) { return false; } // isValidURL() only checks URL format via filter_var(..., FILTER_VALIDATE_URL) // The critical missing check is: // if (!isSSRFSafeURL($callBackURL)) { return false; } if (empty($_executeSchelude[$callBackURL])) { $_executeSchelude[$callBackURL] = url_get_contents($callBackURL, '', 30); ```

`isValidURL()` in `objects/functions.php` uses `filter_var($url, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)` — it validates URL syntax only and does not block internal/private network targets.…