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  <updated>2026-10-18T04:37:56.498838+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276637</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-276637</title>
    <updated>2026-10-18T04:37:56.501013+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-276637</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276637"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33039</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-33039</title>
    <updated>2026-10-18T04:37:56.501046+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. In versions 25.0 and below, the plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php endpoint validates user-supplied URLs against internal/private networks using isSSRFSafeURL(), but only checks the initial URL. When the initial URL responds with an HTTP redirect (Location header), the redirect target is fetched via fakeBrowser() without re-validation, allowing an attacker to reach internal services (cloud metadata, RFC1918 addresses) through an attacker-controlled redirect. This issue is fixed in version 26.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-33039"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9x67-f2v7-63rw</id>
    <title>GHSA-9x67-f2v7-63rw — AVideo vulnerable to unauthenticated SSRF via HTTP redirect bypass in LiveLinks proxy</title>
    <updated>2026-10-18T04:37:56.501076+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Packagist: wwbn/avideo</p>
<p>## Summary
The `plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php` endpoint validates user-supplied URLs against internal/private networks using `isSSRFSafeURL()`, but only checks the initial URL. When the initial URL responds with an HTTP redirect (`Location` header), the redirect target is fetched via `fakeBrowser()` without re-validation, allowing an attacker to reach internal services (cloud metadata, RFC1918 addresses) through an attacker-controlled redirect.</p>
<p>## Affected Component
- `plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php` — lines 38-42 (redirect handling without SSRF re-validation)
- `objects/functionsBrowser.php` — `fakeBrowser()` (line 123, raw cURL fetch with no SSRF protections)</p>
<p>## Description</p>
<p>### Missing SSRF re-validation after HTTP redirect</p>
<p>The `proxy.php` endpoint validates the user-supplied `livelink` parameter against internal networks on line 18, using the comprehensive `isSSRFSafeURL()` function (which blocks private IPs, loopback, link-local/metadata, cloud metadata hostnames, and resolves DNS to detect rebinding). However, after calling `get_headers()` on line 38 — which follows HTTP redirects — the code extracts the `Location` header and passes it directly to `fakeBrowser()` without re-applying the SSRF check:</p>
<p>```php
// plugin/LiveLinks/proxy.php — lines 17-42</p>
<p>// SSRF Protection: Block requests to internal/private networks
if (!isSSRFSafeURL($_GET['livelink'])) {                    // line 18: only checks initial URL
    _error_log("LiveLinks proxy: SSRF protection blocked URL: " .…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-9x67-f2v7-63rw"/>
  </entry>
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