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EUVD-2026-276758

2026-10-10T05:46:29.707786+00:00

EUVD-2026-276758

fkie_cve-2026-32940

2026-10-10T05:46:29.707818+00:00

SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, SanitizeSVG has an incomplete blocklist — it blocks data:text/html and data:image/svg+xml in href attributes but misses data:text/xml and data:application/xml, both of which can render SVG with JavaScript execution. The unauthenticated /api/icon/getDynamicIcon endpoint serves user-controlled input (via the content parameter) directly into SVG markup using fmt.Sprintf with no escaping, served as Content-Type: image/svg+xml. This creates a click-through XSS: a victim navigates to a crafted URL, sees an SVG with an injected link, and clicking it triggers JavaScript via the bypassed MIME types. The attack requires direct navigation to the endpoint or / embedding, since tag rendering in the frontend doesn't allow interactive links. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.

GHSA-4mx9-3c2h-hwhg — SiYuan has a SanitizeSVG bypass via data:text/xml in getDynamicIcon (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-29183)

2026-10-10T05:46:29.707859+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan

# SanitizeSVG bypass via data:text/xml in getDynamicIcon (incomplete fix for CVE-2026-29183)

`SanitizeSVG` blocks `data:text/html` and `data:image/svg+xml` in href attributes but misses `data:text/xml` and `data:application/xml`. Both render SVG with `onload` JavaScript execution (confirmed in Chromium 136, other browsers untested).

`/api/icon/getDynamicIcon` is unauthenticated and serves SVG as `Content-Type: image/svg+xml`. The `content` parameter (type=8) gets embedded into the SVG via `fmt.Sprintf` with no escaping. The sanitizer catches `data:text/html` but `data:text/xml` passes the blocklist -- only three MIME types are checked.

This is a click-through XSS: victim visits the crafted URL, sees an SVG with an injected link, clicks it. If SiYuan renders these icons via `` tags in the frontend, links aren't interactive there -- the attack needs direct navigation to the endpoint URL or ``/`` embedding.

## Steps to reproduce

Against SiYuan v3.6.0 (Docker):

```sh # 1. data:text/xml bypass -- element preserved with href intact curl -s --get "http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/icon/getDynamicIcon" \ --data-urlencode 'type=8' \ --data-urlencode 'content=click' \ | grep -o ']*>' # Output:

# 2. data:text/html is…