https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-15T11:20:32.393528+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276673 EUVD-2026-276673 2026-10-15T11:20:32.395653+00:00 EUVD-2026-276673 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32938 fkie_cve-2026-32938 2026-10-15T11:20:32.395681+00:00

SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, the /api/lute/html2BlockDOM on the desktop copies local files pointed to by file:// links in pasted HTML into the workspace assets directory without validating paths against a sensitive-path list. Together with GET /assets/*path, which only requires authentication, a publish-service visitor can cause the desktop kernel to copy any readable sensitive file and then read it via GET, leading to exfiltration of sensitive files. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-fq2j-j8hc-8vw8 GHSA-fq2j-j8hc-8vw8 — SiYuan Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in Desktop Publish Service 2026-10-15T11:20:32.395712+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

### Summary

In SiYuan, `/api/lute/html2BlockDOM` on the desktop copies local files pointed to by `file://` links in pasted HTML into the workspace assets directory without validating paths against a sensitive-path list. Together with `GET /assets/*path`, which only requires authentication, a publish-service visitor can cause the desktop kernel to copy any readable sensitive file and then read it via GET, leading to exfiltration of sensitive files.

### Details

#### 1. Arbitrary local files copied into workspace

- **Endpoint**: `POST /api/lute/html2BlockDOM`, protected only by `model.CheckAuth`; publish read-only role is not restricted. - **Behavior**: On desktop (`util.ContainerStd == model.Conf.System.Container`), local absolute paths from `<a href="file://...">` in the HTML are copied to `{DataDir}/assets/`. - **Missing check**: The code does not call `util.IsSensitivePath(localPath)` before copying, so any readable file (e.g. `/etc/passwd`, `~/.ssh/id_rsa`) can be copied into assets.

#### 2. Direct access to assets via GET

- **Endpoint**: `GET /assets/*path` (`kernel/server/serve.go`), protected only by `model.CheckAuth`; no publish-scope or admin check. - **Behavior**: The path is resolved with `model.GetAssetAbsPath("assets" + path)` and the file is served with `http.ServeFile`; any authenticated request (including publish visitors) can access existing asset files. - **Attack chain**: The visitor calls html2BlockDOM to copy a sensitive file into `data/assets/`, ext…