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  <updated>2026-10-06T22:43:14.373046+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277438</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-277438</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T22:43:14.419606+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-277438</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-277438"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32750</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-32750</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T22:43:14.419648+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. In versions 3.6.0 and below, POST /api/import/importStdMd passes the localPath parameter directly to model.ImportFromLocalPath with zero path validation. The function recursively reads every file under the given path and permanently stores their content as SiYuan note documents in the workspace database, making them searchable and accessible to all workspace users. Data persists in the workspace database across restarts and is accessible to Publish Service Reader accounts. Combined with the renderSprig SQL injection ( separate advisory ), a non-admin user can then read all imported secrets without any additional privileges. This issue has been fixed in version 3.6.1.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32750"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rjhh-m223-9qqv</id>
    <title>GHSA-rjhh-m223-9qqv — SiYuan importStdMd: unvalidated localPath imports arbitrary host directories as persistent notes</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T22:43:14.419701+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan</p>
<p>### Summary
POST /api/import/importStdMd passes the localPath parameter directly to model.ImportFromLocalPath with zero path validation. The function recursively reads every file under the given path and permanently stores their content as SiYuan note documents in the workspace database, making them searchable and accessible to all workspace users.</p>
<p>### Details
File: kernel/api/import.go - function importStdMd</p>
<p>```go
func importStdMd(c *gin.Context) {
    notebook  := arg["notebook"].(string)
    localPath := arg["localPath"].(string)
    toPath    := arg["toPath"].(string)</p>
<p>err := model.ImportFromLocalPath(notebook, localPath, toPath)
}
```</p>
<p>model.ImportFromLocalPath (kernel/model/import.go:784):
```go
func ImportFromLocalPath(boxID, localPath string, toPath string) (err error) {
    filelock.Walk(localPath, func(currentPath string, d fs.DirEntry, ...) error {
    })
}
```</p>
<p>Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist at all. Any readable path is accepted. The imported content is permanently stored in the workspace SQLite database and survives restarts.</p>
<p>Chained attack with Bug #1 (renderSprig):
Admin imports sensitive files --&gt; content stored in blocks table --&gt; non-admin user queries via querySQL through renderSprig.</p>
<p>### PoC
```bash
docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
  -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
  b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123
```</p>
<p>**Exploit:**
```bash
TOKEN="YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN"</p>
<p>NOTEBOOK=$(curl -s -X POST htt…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-rjhh-m223-9qqv"/>
  </entry>
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