SiYuan is a personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.6.1, POST /api/template/renderSprig lacks model.CheckAdminRole, allowing any authenticated user to execute arbitrary SQL queries against the SiYuan workspace database and exfiltrate all note content, metadata, and custom attributes. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.6.1.

Affected: Go: github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel

### Summary `POST /api/template/renderSprig` lacks `model.CheckAdminRole`, allowing any authenticated user to execute arbitrary SQL queries against the SiYuan workspace database and exfiltrate all note content, metadata, and custom attributes.

### Details **File:** `kernel/api/router.go`

Every sensitive endpoint in the codebase uses `model.CheckAuth + model.CheckAdminRole`, but `renderSprig` only has `CheckAuth`:

```go // Missing CheckAdminRole ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/template/renderSprig", model.CheckAuth, renderSprig)

// Correct pattern used by all other data endpoints ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/template/render", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, renderTemplate) ```

`renderSprig` calls `model.RenderGoTemplate` (`kernel/model/template.go`) which registers SQL functions from `kernel/sql/database.go`:

```go (*templateFuncMap)["querySQL"] = func(stmt string) (ret []map[string]interface{}) { ret, _ = Query(stmt, 1024) // executes raw SELECT, no role check return } ```

Any authenticated user - including Publish Service **Reader** role accounts - can call this endpoint and execute arbitrary SELECT queries.

### PoC **Environment:** ```bash docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \ -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \ b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123 ```

**Exploit:** ```bash # Step 1: Login and retrieve API token curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/system/loginAuth \…