https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-05T22:27:39.369159+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-276046 EUVD-2026-276046 2026-10-05T22:27:39.416656+00:00 EUVD-2026-276046 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32306 fkie_cve-2026-32306 2026-10-05T22:27:39.416691+00:00

OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.23, the telemetry aggregation API accepts user-controlled aggregationType, aggregateColumnName, and aggregationTimestampColumnName parameters and interpolates them directly into ClickHouse SQL queries via the .append() method (documented as "trusted SQL"). There is no allowlist, no parameterized query binding, and no input validation. An authenticated user can inject arbitrary SQL into ClickHouse, enabling full database read (including telemetry data from all tenants), data modification, and potential remote code execution via ClickHouse table functions. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.23.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-p5g2-jm85-8g35 GHSA-p5g2-jm85-8g35 — OneUptime ClickHouse SQL Injection via Aggregate Query Parameters 2026-10-05T22:27:39.416728+00:00

Affected: npm: oneuptime

### Summary

The telemetry aggregation API accepts user-controlled `aggregationType`, `aggregateColumnName`, and `aggregationTimestampColumnName` parameters and interpolates them directly into ClickHouse SQL queries via the `.append()` method (documented as "trusted SQL"). There is no allowlist, no parameterized query binding, and no input validation. An authenticated user can inject arbitrary SQL into ClickHouse, enabling full database read (including telemetry data from all tenants), data modification, and potential remote code execution via ClickHouse table functions.

### Details

**Entry Point — `Common/Server/API/BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts:88-98, 292-296`:**

The `POST /{modelName}/aggregate` route deserializes `aggregateBy` directly from the request body:

```typescript // BaseAnalyticsAPI.ts:292-296 const aggregateBy: AggregateBy<TBaseModel> = JSONFunctions.deserialize( req.body["aggregateBy"] ) as AggregateBy<TBaseModel>; ```

No schema validation is applied to `aggregateBy`. The object flows directly to the database service.

**No Validation — `Common/Server/Services/AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:276-278`:**

```typescript // AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts:276-278 if (aggregateBy.aggregationType) { // Only truthiness check — no allowlist } ```

The `aggregationType` field is only checked for existence, never validated against an allowed set of values (e.g., `AVG`, `SUM`, `COUNT`).

**Raw SQL Injection — `Common/Server/Utils/AnalyticsDatabase/StatementGenerator.ts:527`:…