https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-12T05:33:00.337522+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-275915 EUVD-2026-275915 2026-10-12T05:33:00.339824+00:00 EUVD-2026-275915 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-32231 fkie_cve-2026-32231 2026-10-12T05:33:00.339855+00:00

ZeptoClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 0.7.6, the generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields (sender, chat_id) from the request body and applies authorization checks to those untrusted values. Because authentication is optional and defaults to disabled (auth_token: None), an attacker who can reach POST /webhook can spoof an allowlisted sender and choose arbitrary chat_id values, enabling high-risk message spoofing and potential IDOR-style session/chat routing abuse. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.7.6.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-46q5-g3j9-wx5c GHSA-46q5-g3j9-wx5c — ZeptoClaw: Generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields; allowlist is checked against untrusted paylo… 2026-10-12T05:33:00.339888+00:00

Affected: crates.io: zeptoclaw

### Summary The generic webhook channel trusts caller-supplied identity fields (`sender`, `chat_id`) from the request body and applies authorization checks to those untrusted values. Because authentication is optional and defaults to disabled (`auth_token: None`), an attacker who can reach `POST /webhook` can spoof an allowlisted sender and choose arbitrary `chat_id` values, enabling high-risk message spoofing and potential IDOR-style session/chat routing abuse.

### Details Relevant code paths:

- `src/channels/webhook.rs:121` sets runtime default `auth_token: None`. - `src/config/types.rs:910` also defaults webhook config `auth_token` to `None`. - `src/channels/webhook.rs:224` (`validate_auth`) explicitly allows requests when no token is configured. - `src/channels/webhook.rs:128` defines `WebhookPayload` with identity fields fully controlled by caller input: - `sender: String` - `chat_id: String` - `src/channels/webhook.rs:421` performs allowlist authorization using `payload.sender`. - `src/channels/webhook.rs:433` and `src/channels/webhook.rs:434` create `InboundMessage` using untrusted `payload.sender` and `payload.chat_id`.

Why this is vulnerable:

- The system treats user-provided JSON identity as authoritative identity. - Allowlist enforcement does not verify sender authenticity beyond that payload value. - `chat_id` is also attacker-controlled, so routing/session association can be steered to arbitrary chats/conversations. - If the webhook is exposed without st…