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EUVD-2026-276018

2026-10-15T18:19:42.975690+00:00

EUVD-2026-276018

fkie_cve-2026-31886

2026-10-15T18:19:42.975726+00:00

Dagu is a workflow engine with a built-in Web user interface. Prior to 2.2.4, the dagRunId request field accepted by the inline DAG execution endpoints is passed directly into filepath.Join to construct a temporary directory path without any format validation. Go's filepath.Join resolves .. segments lexically, so a caller can supply a value such as ".." to redirect the computed directory outside the intended /tmp// path. A deferred cleanup function that calls os.RemoveAll on that directory then runs unconditionally when the HTTP handler returns, deleting whatever directory the traversal resolved to. With dagRunId set to "..", the resolved directory is the system temporary directory (/tmp on Linux). On non-root deployments, os.RemoveAll("/tmp") removes all files in /tmp owned by the dagu process user, disrupting every concurrent dagu run that has live temp files. On root or Docker deployments, the call removes the entire contents of /tmp, causing a system-wide denial of service. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.2.4.

GHSA-m4q3-457p-hh2x — Dagu: Path Traversal via `dagRunId` in Inline DAG Execution

2026-10-15T18:19:42.975765+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/dagu-org/dagu

## 1. Vulnerability Summary

The `dagRunId` request field accepted by the inline DAG execution endpoints is passed directly into `filepath.Join` to construct a temporary directory path without any format validation. Go's `filepath.Join` resolves `..` segments lexically, so a caller can supply a value such as `".."` to redirect the computed directory outside the intended `/tmp//` path. A deferred cleanup function that calls `os.RemoveAll` on that directory then runs unconditionally when the HTTP handler returns, deleting whatever directory the traversal resolved to.

With `dagRunId` set to `".."`, the resolved directory is the system temporary directory (`/tmp` on Linux). On non-root deployments, `os.RemoveAll("/tmp")` removes all files in `/tmp` owned by the dagu process user, disrupting every concurrent dagu run that has live temp files. On root or Docker deployments, the call removes the entire contents of `/tmp`, causing a system-wide denial of service.

## 2. This Is Not a Duplicate of Existing Advisories

Two security advisories are already published for dagu. This vulnerability is distinct from both.

**GHSA-6qr9-g2xw-cw92** fixed the fact that the default authentication mode was `none`, allowing unauthenticated access to the inline execution endpoint. That advisory covers authentication bypass. The `dagRunId` path traversal described here is a separate input-validation flaw in `loadInlineDAG()` that exists regardless of whether authentication is required an…