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EUVD-2026-275325

2026-10-07T20:28:39.608860+00:00

EUVD-2026-275325

fkie_cve-2026-30956

2026-10-07T20:28:39.608901+00:00

OneUptime is a solution for monitoring and managing online services. Prior to 10.0.21, a low‑privileged user can bypass authorization and tenant isolation in OneUptime v10.0.20 and earlier by sending a forged is-multi-tenant-query header together with a controlled projectid header. Because the server trusts this client-supplied header, internal permission checks in BasePermission are skipped and tenant scoping is disabled. This allows attackers to access project data belonging to other tenants, read sensitive User fields via nested relations, leak plaintext resetPasswordToken, and reset the victim’s password and fully take over the account. This results in cross‑tenant data exposure and full account takeover. This vulnerability is fixed in 10.0.21.

GHSA-r5v6-2599-9g3m — OneUptime has authorization bypass via client‑controlled is-multi-tenant-query header that leads to cross‑tenant data e…

2026-10-07T20:28:39.608941+00:00

Affected: npm: @oneuptime/common

### Summary A low‑privileged user can bypass authorization and tenant isolation in OneUptime `v10.0.20` by sending a forged `is-multi-tenant-query` header together with a controlled `projectid` header.

Because the server trusts this client-supplied header, internal permission checks in `BasePermission` are skipped and tenant scoping is disabled.

This allows attackers to:

1. Access project data belonging to other tenants 2. Read sensitive User fields via nested relations 3. Leak plaintext resetPasswordToken 4. Reset the victim’s password and fully take over the account

This results in cross‑tenant data exposure and full account takeover.

### Details

Root cause

The API trusts a client‑controlled header to determine whether a request should bypass authorization checks.

CommonAPI.ts ``` if (req.headers["is-multi-tenant-query"]) { props.isMultiTenantRequest = true; } ``` BasePermission.ts ``` if (!props.isMultiTenantRequest) { TablePermission.checkTableLevelPermissions(...) QueryPermission.checkQueryPermission(...) SelectPermission.checkSelectPermission(...) } ``` When the attacker sends: ``` is-multi-tenant-query: true ``` the system skips all authorization checks including:

- Table permission validation - Query permission validation - Select permission validation - Tenant isolation enforcement

Additionally, tenant scoping is disabled in `TenantPermission`

Sensitive user data exposure

Projects marked with: ``` @MultiTenentQueryAllowed(true) ``` allow cross-te…