PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. Prior to version 0.7.7, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the /download endpoint allows any user with API access to induce the PinchTab server to make requests to arbitrary URLs, including internal network services and local system files, and exfiltrate the full response content. This issue has been patched in version 0.7.7.

Affected: Go: github.com/pinchtab/pinchtab/cmd/pinchtab

# SSRF with Full Response Exfiltration via Download Handler

### Summary A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the `/download` endpoint allows any user with API access to induce the PinchTab server to make requests to arbitrary URLs, including internal network services and local system files, and exfiltrate the full response content.

### Details The `GET /download?url=<url>` handler in [download.go](file:///Users/quan.m.le/Workspaces/pinchtab/internal/handlers/download.go#L78) accepts a user-controlled `url` parameter and passes it directly to `chromedp.Navigate(dlURL)` without any validation or sanitization.

```go // internal/handlers/download.go:78 if err := chromedp.Run(ctx, chromedp.Navigate(dlURL)); err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("navigate to %s: %w", dlURL, err) } ```

Since the request is performed by the headless Chrome browser instance managed by PinchTab, it can access: 1. **Local Files**: Using the `file://` scheme (e.g., `file:///etc/passwd`). 2. **Internal Services**: Accessing services bound to `localhost` or internal network IPs that are not reachable from the outside. 3. **Cloud Metadata**: Accessing cloud provider metadata endpoints (e.g., `169.254.169.254`).

The server then returns the captured response body directly to the attacker, enabling full exfiltration of sensitive data.

### PoC To reproduce the vulnerability, ensure the PinchTab server is running and accessible.

1. **Local File Read**: Execute the following curl com…