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  <updated>2026-10-06T01:38:42.056619+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-275005</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-275005</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T01:38:42.103915+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-275005</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-275005"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-30832</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-30832</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T01:38:42.103952+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Soft Serve is a self-hostable Git server for the command line. From version 0.6.0 to before version 0.11.4, an authenticated SSH user can force the server to make HTTP requests to internal/private IP addresses by running repo import with a crafted --lfs-endpoint URL. The initial batch request is blind (the response from a metadata endpoint won't parse as valid LFS JSON), but an attacker hosting a fake LFS server can chain this into full read access to internal services by returning download URLs that point at internal targets. This issue has been patched in version 0.11.4.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-30832"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3fvx-xrxq-8jvv</id>
    <title>GHSA-3fvx-xrxq-8jvv — soft-serve vulnerable to SSRF via unvalidated LFS endpoint in repo import</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T01:38:42.103988+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve</p>
<p>While auditing the codebase in the wake of the webhook SSRF fix shipped in v0.11.1 (GHSA-vwq2-jx9q-9h9f), it was identified that the LFS import path was never given the same treatment. The webhook fix introduced dual-layer SSRF protection — ValidateWebhookURL() at creation time and secureHTTPClient with IP validation at dial time — but the LFS HTTP client still uses http.DefaultClient with no filtering at all.</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>An authenticated SSH user can force the server to make HTTP requests to internal/private IP addresses by running `repo import` with a crafted `--lfs-endpoint` URL. The initial batch request is blind (the response from a metadata endpoint won't parse as valid LFS JSON), but an attacker hosting a fake LFS server can chain this into full read access to internal services by returning download URLs that point at internal targets.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The user-controlled endpoint flows through four files with zero validation:</p>
<p>**1. User supplies the URL via `--lfs-endpoint`** (`pkg/ssh/cmd/import.go:20-41`)</p>
<p>```go
cmd.Flags().StringVarP(&amp;lfsEndpoint, "lfs-endpoint", "", "", "set the Git LFS endpoint")
```</p>
<p>The flag value is passed directly into `proto.RepositoryOptions{LFSEndpoint: lfsEndpoint}` at line 40 and then to `be.ImportRepository()`.</p>
<p>**2. Access check passes for any authenticated user** (`pkg/ssh/cmd/cmd.go:172-187`, `pkg/backend/user.go:94-100`)</p>
<p>The import command uses `checkIfCollab` as its `PersistentPreRunE`. For a new repo name (which is normal during…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-3fvx-xrxq-8jvv"/>
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