https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-18T09:15:23.859161+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-275125 EUVD-2026-275125 2026-10-18T09:15:23.912706+00:00 EUVD-2026-275125 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-30247 fkie_cve-2026-30247 2026-10-18T09:15:23.912749+00:00

WeKnora is an LLM-powered framework designed for deep document understanding and semantic retrieval. Prior to version 0.2.12, the application's "Import document via URL" feature is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) through HTTP redirects. While the backend implements comprehensive URL validation (blocking private IPs, loopback addresses, reserved hostnames, and cloud metadata endpoints), it fails to validate redirect targets. An attacker can bypass all protections by using a redirect chain, forcing the server to access internal services. Additionally, Docker-specific internal addresses like host.docker.internal are not blocked. This issue has been patched in version 0.2.12.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-595m-wc8g-6qgc GHSA-595m-wc8g-6qgc — WeKnora is Vulnerable to SSRF via Redirection 2026-10-18T09:15:23.912789+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/Tencent/WeKnora

### Summary

The application's "Import document via URL" feature is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) through HTTP redirects. While the backend implements comprehensive URL validation (blocking private IPs, loopback addresses, reserved hostnames, and cloud metadata endpoints), it **fails to validate redirect targets**. An attacker can bypass all protections by using a redirect chain, forcing the server to access internal services. Additionally, Docker-specific internal addresses like `host.docker.internal` are not blocked.

### Details

The `/api/v1/knowledge-bases/{id}/knowledge/url` endpoint validates the initial URL but follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the destination. This allows attackers to: 1. Submit a URL to an attacker-controlled domain (passes validation) 2. Have that domain respond with a 307 redirect to an internal service 3. The backend automatically follows the redirect without checking if the destination is restricted 4. The internal service response is exposed to the attacker

### Validation Gaps - The `IsSSRFSafeURL()` function (in `internal/utils/security.go`) validates the initial URL thoroughly, but there's no validation of HTTP redirect targets - `host.docker.internal` is not in the `restrictedHostnames` list - Docker-specific IP ranges (172.17.0.0/16 for bridge networks) are not explicitly blocked - The code validates `parsed.Hostname()` from the initial URL, but redirect Location headers bypass this check

### Root Cause Anal…