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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-06T03:57:36.789418+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292994</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-292994</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T03:57:36.836545+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-292994</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-292994"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-29050</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-29050</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T03:57:36.836583+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>melange allows users to build apk packages using declarative pipelines. Starting in version 0.32.0 and prior to version 0.43.4, an attacker who can influence a melange configuration file — for example through pull-request-driven CI or build-as-a-service scenarios — could set `pipeline[].uses` to a value containing `../` sequences or an absolute path. The `(*Compiled).compilePipeline` function in `pkg/build/compile.go` passed `uses` directly to `filepath.Join(pipelineDir, uses + ".yaml")` without validating the value, so the resolved path could escape each `--pipeline-dir` and read an arbitrary YAML-parseable file visible to the melange process. Because the loaded file is subsequently interpreted as a melange pipeline and its `runs:` block is executed via `/bin/sh -c` in the build sandbox, this additionally allowed shell commands sourced from an out-of-tree file to run during the build, bypassing the review boundary that normally covers the in-tree pipeline definition. The issue is fixed in melange v0.43.4 via commit 5829ca4. The fix rejects `uses` values that are absolute paths or contain `..`, and verifies (via `filepath.Rel` after `filepath.Clean`) that the resolved target remains within the pipeline directory. As a workaround, only run `melange build` against configuration files from trusted sources. In CI systems that build user-supplied melange configs, gate builds behind manual review of `pipeline[].uses` values and reject any containing `..` or leading `/`.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-29050"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-98f2-w9h9-7fp9</id>
    <title>GHSA-98f2-w9h9-7fp9 — melange has Path Traversal When Resolving External Pipelines via Unvalidated pipeline[].uses</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T03:57:36.836629+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Go: chainguard.dev/melange</p>
<p>### Impact</p>
<p>An attacker who can influence a melange configuration file — for example through pull-request-driven CI or build-as-a-service scenarios — could set `pipeline[].uses` to a value containing `../` sequences or an absolute path. The `(*Compiled).compilePipeline` function in `pkg/build/compile.go` passed `uses` directly to `filepath.Join(pipelineDir, uses + ".yaml")` without validating the value, so the resolved path could escape each `--pipeline-dir` and read an arbitrary YAML-parseable file visible to the melange process. Because the loaded file is subsequently interpreted as a melange pipeline and its `runs:` block is executed via `/bin/sh -c` in the build sandbox, this additionally allowed shell commands sourced from an out-of-tree file to run during the build, bypassing the review boundary that normally covers the in-tree pipeline definition.</p>
<p>### Patches</p>
<p>Fixed in melange **v0.43.4** via commit [5829ca4](https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange/commit/5829ca45cfe14dfeb73ffb716992db3b1b7892ac). The fix rejects `uses` values that are absolute paths or contain `..`, and verifies (via `filepath.Rel` after `filepath.Clean`) that the resolved target remains within the pipeline directory.</p>
<p>### Workarounds</p>
<p>Only run `melange build` against configuration files from trusted sources. In CI systems that build user-supplied melange configs, gate builds behind manual review of `pipeline[].uses` values and reject any containing `..` or leading `/`.</p>
<p>### Credits</p>
<p>melange thank…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-98f2-w9h9-7fp9"/>
  </entry>
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