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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-15T17:33:26.484760+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-273551</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-273551</title>
    <updated>2026-10-15T17:33:26.521139+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-273551</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-273551"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-27952</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-27952</title>
    <updated>2026-10-15T17:33:26.521173+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Agenta is an open-source LLMOps platform. In Agenta-API prior to version 0.48.1, a Python sandbox escape vulnerability existed in Agenta's custom code evaluator. Agenta used RestrictedPython as a sandboxing mechanism for user-supplied evaluator code, but incorrectly whitelisted the `numpy` package as safe within the sandbox. This allowed authenticated users to bypass the sandbox and achieve arbitrary code execution on the API server. The escape path was through `numpy.ma.core.inspect`, which exposes Python's introspection utilities — including `sys.modules` — thereby providing access to unfiltered system-level functionality like `os.system`. This vulnerability affects the Agenta self-hosted platform (API server), not the SDK when used as a standalone Python library. The custom code evaluator runs server-side within the API process. The issue is fixed in v0.48.1 by removing `numpy` from the sandbox allowlist. In later versions (v0.60+), the RestrictedPython sandbox was removed entirely and replaced with a different execution model.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-27952"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-6</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-6</title>
    <updated>2026-10-15T17:33:26.521226+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: agenta</p>
<p>Agenta is an open-source LLMOps platform. In Agenta-API prior to version 0.48.1, a Python sandbox escape vulnerability existed in Agenta's custom code evaluator. Agenta used RestrictedPython as a sandboxing mechanism for user-supplied evaluator code, but incorrectly whitelisted the `numpy` package as safe within the sandbox. This allowed authenticated users to bypass the sandbox and achieve arbitrary code execution on the API server. The escape path was through `numpy.ma.core.inspect`, which exposes Python's introspection utilities — including `sys.modules` — thereby providing access to unfiltered system-level functionality like `os.system`. This vulnerability affects the Agenta self-hosted platform (API server), not the SDK when used as a standalone Python library. The custom code evaluator runs server-side within the API process. The issue is fixed in v0.48.1 by removing `numpy` from the sandbox allowlist. In later versions (v0.60+), the RestrictedPython sandbox was removed entirely and replaced with a different execution model.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-6"/>
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