https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-06T22:57:55.530627+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-273817 EUVD-2026-273817 2026-10-06T22:57:55.585196+00:00 EUVD-2026-273817 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-27734 fkie_cve-2026-27734 2026-10-06T22:57:55.585232+00:00

Beszel is a server monitoring platform. Prior to version 0.18.2, the hub's authenticated API endpoints GET /api/beszel/containers/logs and GET /api/beszel/containers/info pass the user-supplied "container" query parameter to the agent without validation. The agent constructs Docker Engine API URLs using fmt.Sprintf with the raw value instead of url.PathEscape(). Since Go's http.Client does not sanitize `../` sequences from URL paths sent over unix sockets, an authenticated user (including readonly role) can traverse to arbitrary Docker API endpoints on agent hosts, exposing sensitive infrastructure details. Version 0.18.4 fixes the issue.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-phwh-4f42-gwf3 GHSA-phwh-4f42-gwf3 — Beszel: Docker API has a Path Traversal Vulnerability via Unsanitized Container ID 2026-10-06T22:57:55.585270+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/henrygd/beszel

### Summary

The hub's authenticated API endpoints GET /api/beszel/containers/logs and GET /api/beszel/containers/info pass the user-supplied "container" query parameter to the agent without validation. The agent constructs Docker Engine API URLs using fmt.Sprintf with the raw value instead of url.PathEscape(). Since Go's http.Client does not sanitize ../ sequences from URL paths sent over unix sockets, an authenticated user (including readonly role) can traverse to arbitrary Docker API endpoints on agent hosts, exposing sensitive infrastructure details.

### Details

**Hub** (internal/hub/hub.go:407-426): `containerID` from query param is only checked for emptiness, no format validation: ```go containerID := e.Request.URL.Query().Get("container") if systemID == "" || containerID == "" { ... } data, err := fetchFunc(system, containerID) // passed directly to agent ```

**Agent** (agent/docker.go:651-652 and 682-683): raw containerID interpolated into Docker API URL: ```go endpoint := fmt.Sprintf("http://localhost/containers/%s/json", containerID) endpoint := fmt.Sprintf("http://localhost/containers/%s/logs?stdout=1&stderr=1&tail=%d", containerID, dockerLogsTail) ```

Go's http.Client preserves `../` in paths over unix sockets (verified with test code). The Docker daemon resolves them via cleanPath, routing the request to unintended API endpoints.

### PoC

Tested on Beszel v0.18.3 with hub and agent running in Docker (host network mode). ```bash # Authenticate TOKEN=$(curl…