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  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-12T23:41:36.834330+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-273600</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-273600</title>
    <updated>2026-10-12T23:41:36.880496+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-273600</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-273600"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-27695</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-27695</title>
    <updated>2026-10-12T23:41:36.880529+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>zae-limiter is a rate limiting library using the token bucket algorithm. Prior to version 0.10.1, all rate limit buckets for a single entity share the same DynamoDB partition key (`namespace/ENTITY#{id}`). A high-traffic entity can exceed DynamoDB's per-partition throughput limits (~1,000 WCU/sec), causing throttling that degrades service for that entity — and potentially co-located entities in the same partition. Version 0.10.1 fixes the issue.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-27695"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-76rv-2r9v-c5m6</id>
    <title>GHSA-76rv-2r9v-c5m6 — zae-limiter: DynamoDB hot partition throttling enables per-entity Denial of Service</title>
    <updated>2026-10-12T23:41:36.880575+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: zae-limiter</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>All rate limit buckets for a single entity share the same DynamoDB partition key (`namespace/ENTITY#{id}`). A high-traffic entity can exceed DynamoDB's per-partition throughput limits (~1,000 WCU/sec), causing throttling that degrades service for that entity — and potentially co-located entities in the same partition.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>Each `acquire()` call performs a `TransactWriteItems` (or `UpdateItem` in speculative mode) against items sharing the same partition key. For cascade entities, this doubles to 2-4 writes per request (child + parent). At sustained rates above ~500 req/sec for a single entity, DynamoDB's adaptive capacity may not redistribute fast enough, causing `ProvisionedThroughputExceededException`.</p>
<p>The library has no built-in mitigation:
- No partition key sharding/salting
- No write coalescing or batching
- No client-side admission control before hitting DynamoDB
- `RateLimiterUnavailable` is raised but the caller has already been delayed</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>- **Availability**: High-traffic entities experience elevated latency and rejected requests beyond what their rate limits specify
- **Fairness**: Other entities sharing the same DynamoDB partition may experience collateral throttling
- **Multi-tenant risk**: In a shared LLM proxy scenario, one tenant's burst traffic could degrade service for others</p>
<p>## Reproduction</p>
<p>1. Create an entity with high rate limits (e.g., 100,000 rpm)
2. Send sustained traffic at 1,000+ req/sec to a single entity
3. Observe D…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-76rv-2r9v-c5m6"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3434</id>
    <title>PYSEC-2026-3434 — zae-limiter: DynamoDB hot partition throttling enables per-entity Denial of Service</title>
    <updated>2026-10-12T23:41:36.880627+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> PyPI: zae-limiter</p>
<p>## Summary</p>
<p>All rate limit buckets for a single entity share the same DynamoDB partition key (`namespace/ENTITY#{id}`). A high-traffic entity can exceed DynamoDB's per-partition throughput limits (~1,000 WCU/sec), causing throttling that degrades service for that entity — and potentially co-located entities in the same partition.</p>
<p>## Details</p>
<p>Each `acquire()` call performs a `TransactWriteItems` (or `UpdateItem` in speculative mode) against items sharing the same partition key. For cascade entities, this doubles to 2-4 writes per request (child + parent). At sustained rates above ~500 req/sec for a single entity, DynamoDB's adaptive capacity may not redistribute fast enough, causing `ProvisionedThroughputExceededException`.</p>
<p>The library has no built-in mitigation:
- No partition key sharding/salting
- No write coalescing or batching
- No client-side admission control before hitting DynamoDB
- `RateLimiterUnavailable` is raised but the caller has already been delayed</p>
<p>## Impact</p>
<p>- **Availability**: High-traffic entities experience elevated latency and rejected requests beyond what their rate limits specify
- **Fairness**: Other entities sharing the same DynamoDB partition may experience collateral throttling
- **Multi-tenant risk**: In a shared LLM proxy scenario, one tenant's burst traffic could degrade service for others</p>
<p>## Reproduction</p>
<p>1. Create an entity with high rate limits (e.g., 100,000 rpm)
2. Send sustained traffic at 1,000+ req/sec to a single entity
3. Observe D…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/pysec-2026-3434"/>
  </entry>
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