<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10</id>
  <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
  <updated>2026-10-16T18:45:55.451626+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
  <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org" rel="alternate"/>
  <generator uri="https://lkiesow.github.io/python-feedgen" version="1.0.0">python-feedgen</generator>
  <subtitle>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</subtitle>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-26316</id>
    <title>BREW-openclaw-cli-CVE-2026-26316 — OpenClaw BlueBubbles webhook auth bypass via loopback proxy trust</title>
    <updated>2026-10-16T18:45:55.504097+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> Homebrew: openclaw-cli</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>In affected versions, the optional BlueBubbles iMessage channel plugin could accept webhook requests as authenticated based only on the TCP peer address being loopback (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, `::ffff:127.0.0.1`) even when the configured webhook secret was missing or incorrect. This does not affect the default iMessage integration unless BlueBubbles is installed and enabled.</p>
<p>### Affected Packages / Versions</p>
<p>- npm: `openclaw` `&lt; 2026.2.13`
- npm: `@openclaw/bluebubbles` `&lt; 2026.2.13`</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>If a deployment exposes the BlueBubbles webhook endpoint through a same-host reverse proxy (or an attacker can reach loopback via SSRF), an unauthenticated party may be able to inject inbound webhook events into the agent pipeline.</p>
<p>### Fix Commit(s)</p>
<p>- f836c385ffc746cb954e8ee409f99d079bfdcd2f
- 743f4b28495cdeb0d5bf76f6ebf4af01f6a02e5a (defense-in-depth)</p>
<p>### Mitigations</p>
<p>- Set a non-empty BlueBubbles webhook password.
- Avoid deployments where a public-facing reverse proxy forwards to a loopback-bound Gateway without strong upstream authentication.</p>
<p>Thanks @MegaManSec (https://joshua.hu) of [AISLE Research Team](https://aisle.com/) for reporting.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/brew-openclaw-cli-cve-2026-26316"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2026-13381</id>
    <title>cnvd-2026-13381</title>
    <updated>2026-10-16T18:45:55.504167+00:00</updated>
    <content>cnvd-2026-13381</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/cnvd-2026-13381"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-268955</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-268955</title>
    <updated>2026-10-16T18:45:55.504185+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-268955</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-268955"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-26316</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-26316</title>
    <updated>2026-10-16T18:45:55.504198+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>OpenClaw is a personal AI assistant. Prior to 2026.2.13, the optional BlueBubbles iMessage channel plugin could accept webhook requests as authenticated based only on the TCP peer address being loopback (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, `::ffff:127.0.0.1`) even when the configured webhook secret was missing or incorrect. This does not affect the default iMessage integration unless BlueBubbles is installed and enabled. Version 2026.2.13 contains a patch. Other mitigations include setting a non-empty BlueBubbles webhook password and avoiding deployments where a public-facing reverse proxy forwards to a loopback-bound Gateway without strong upstream authentication.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-26316"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pchc-86f6-8758</id>
    <title>GHSA-pchc-86f6-8758 — OpenClaw BlueBubbles webhook auth bypass via loopback proxy trust</title>
    <updated>2026-10-16T18:45:55.504221+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> npm: openclaw, npm: @openclaw/bluebubbles</p>
<p>### Summary</p>
<p>In affected versions, the optional BlueBubbles iMessage channel plugin could accept webhook requests as authenticated based only on the TCP peer address being loopback (`127.0.0.1`, `::1`, `::ffff:127.0.0.1`) even when the configured webhook secret was missing or incorrect. This does not affect the default iMessage integration unless BlueBubbles is installed and enabled.</p>
<p>### Affected Packages / Versions</p>
<p>- npm: `openclaw` `&lt; 2026.2.13`
- npm: `@openclaw/bluebubbles` `&lt; 2026.2.13`</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>If a deployment exposes the BlueBubbles webhook endpoint through a same-host reverse proxy (or an attacker can reach loopback via SSRF), an unauthenticated party may be able to inject inbound webhook events into the agent pipeline.</p>
<p>### Fix Commit(s)</p>
<p>- f836c385ffc746cb954e8ee409f99d079bfdcd2f
- 743f4b28495cdeb0d5bf76f6ebf4af01f6a02e5a (defense-in-depth)</p>
<p>### Mitigations</p>
<p>- Set a non-empty BlueBubbles webhook password.
- Avoid deployments where a public-facing reverse proxy forwards to a loopback-bound Gateway without strong upstream authentication.</p>
<p>Thanks @MegaManSec (https://joshua.hu) of [AISLE Research Team](https://aisle.com/) for reporting.</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-pchc-86f6-8758"/>
  </entry>
</feed>
