https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-06T09:22:45.111304+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-267776 EUVD-2026-267776 2026-10-06T09:22:45.113985+00:00 EUVD-2026-267776 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-25791 fkie_cve-2026-25791 2026-10-06T09:22:45.114029+00:00

Sliver is a command and control framework that uses a custom Wireguard netstack. Prior to 1.7.0, the DNS C2 listener accepts unauthenticated TOTP bootstrap messages and allocates server-side DNS sessions without validating OTP values, even when EnforceOTP is enabled. Because sessions are stored without a cleanup/expiry path in this flow, an unauthenticated remote actor can repeatedly create sessions and drive memory exhaustion. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.7.0.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-wxrw-gvg8-fqjp GHSA-wxrw-gvg8-fqjp — Sliver has DNS C2 OTP Bypass that Allows Unauthenticated Session Flooding and Denial of Service 2026-10-06T09:22:45.114075+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/bishopfox/sliver

## Summary The DNS C2 listener accepts unauthenticated `TOTP` bootstrap messages and allocates server-side DNS sessions without validating OTP values, even when `EnforceOTP` is enabled. Because sessions are stored without a cleanup/expiry path in this flow, an unauthenticated remote actor can repeatedly create sessions and drive memory exhaustion.

## Vulnerable Component - `server/c2/dns.go:84-90` (`EnforceOTP` stored but not enforced in bootstrap) - `server/c2/dns.go:378-390` (`TOTP` requests routed directly to bootstrap) - `server/c2/dns.go:490-521` (`handleHello` allocates session without OTP validation) - `server/c2/dns.go:495` (`sessions.Store` with no lifecycle control in this path) - `client/command/jobs/dns.go:46-52` (operator-facing `EnforceOTP` control implies auth gate) - `implant/sliver/transports/dnsclient/dnsclient.go:896-900` (`otpMsg` sends `TOTP` with `ID=0`) - `protobuf/dnspb/dns.proto:22` (documents TOTP in `ID` field)

## Attack Vector - Network-accessible DNS listener - No authentication required - Low-complexity repeated DNS query loop - Trigger path: `DNSMessageType_TOTP` bootstrap handling

## Proof of Concept ### Preconditions - DNS listener is reachable - DNS C2 job is active

### Reproduction Steps 1. Send repeated DNS queries with a minimal protobuf message of type `TOTP`. 2. Observe repeated session allocation/issuance behavior. 3. Continue requests to increase active in-memory session state.

### Example ```bash while true; do dig +short @<DN…