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EUVD-2026-267316

2026-10-07T04:10:01.923104+00:00

EUVD-2026-267316

fkie_cve-2026-25059

2026-10-07T04:10:01.923144+00:00

OpenList Frontend is a UI component for OpenList. Prior to 4.1.10, the application contains path traversal vulnerability in multiple file operation handlers in server/handles/fsmanage.go. Filename components in req.Names are directly concatenated with validated directories using stdpath.Join. This allows ".." sequences to bypass path restrictions, enabling users to access other users' files within the same storage mount and perform unauthorized actions such as deletion, renaming, or copying of files. An authenticated attacker can bypass directory-level authorisation by injecting traversal sequences into filename components, enabling unauthorised file removal and copying across user boundaries within the same storage mount. This vulnerability is fixed in 4.1.10.

GHSA-qmj2-8r24-xxcq — OpenList vulnerable to Path Traversal in file copy and remove handlers

2026-10-07T04:10:01.923182+00:00

Affected: Go: github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/v4

### Summary The application contains a Path Traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) in multiple file operation handlers. An authenticated attacker can bypass directory-level authorisation by injecting traversal sequences into filename components, enabling unauthorised file removal and copying across user boundaries within the same storage mount.

### Details The application contains a Path Traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) in multiple file operation handlers in *server/handles/fsmanage.go*. Filename components in `req.Names` are directly concatenated with validated directories using `stdpath.Join`. This allows ".." sequences to bypass path restrictions, enabling users to access other users' files within the same storage mount and perform unauthorized actions such as deletion, renaming, or copying of files.

[FsRemove](https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/blob/5db2172ed681346b69ed468c73c1f01b6ed455ea/server/handles/fsmanage.go#L284-L285): ~~~ func FsRemove(c *gin.Context) { // ... for _, name := range req.Names { err := fs.Remove(c, stdpath.Join(reqDir, name)) ~~~

[FsCopy](https://github.com/OpenListTeam/OpenList/blob/5db2172ed681346b69ed468c73c1f01b6ed455ea/server/handles/fsmanage.go#L163-L164): ~~~ func FsCopy(c *gin.Context) { // ... if !req.Overwrite { for _, name := range req.Names { if res, _ := fs.Get(c.Request.Context(), stdpath.Join(dstDir, name), &fs.GetArgs{NoLog: true}); res != nil { ~~~

### PoC Scenario: A normal user ("alice") bypasses directory restr…