NocoDB is software for building databases as spreadsheets. Prior to version 0.301.0, an unvalidated redirect (open redirect) vulnerability exists in NocoDB’s login flow due to missing validation of the `continueAfterSignIn` parameter. During authentication, NocoDB processes a user-controlled redirect value and conditionally performs client-side navigation without enforcing any restrictions on the destination’s origin, domain or protocol. This allows attackers to redirect authenticated users to arbitrary external websites after login. This vulnerability enables phishing attacks by leveraging user trust in the legitimate NocoDB login flow. While it does not directly expose credentials or bypass authentication, it increases the likelihood of credential theft through social engineering. The issue does not allow arbitrary code execution or privilege escalation, but it undermines authentication integrity. Version 0.301.0 fixes the issue.

Affected: npm: nocodb

### Summary

An **unvalidated redirect (open redirect)** vulnerability exists in NocoDB’s login flow due to missing validation of the `continueAfterSignIn` parameter.

During authentication, NocoDB processes a user-controlled redirect value and conditionally performs client-side navigation without enforcing any restrictions on the destination’s origin, domain or protocol. This allows attackers to redirect authenticated users to arbitrary external websites after login.

### Root Cause

The redirect logic relies on a permissive URL check that treats any absolute or protocol-relative URL as safe, and performs navigation without applying an allowlist or origin validation.

In the redirect plugin:

* The helper function `isFullUrl` uses the following regular expression:

```ts /^(https?:)?\/\// ```

This pattern matches any HTTP(S) URL as well as protocol-relative URLs (e.g., `//evil.example`), without restricting allowed domains.

* When the `continueAfterSignIn` query parameter matches this pattern, the application performs an unconditional external navigation:

```ts navigateTo(route.value.query.continueAfterSignIn as string, { external: isFullUrl(...) }) ```

### Attack Scenario

An attacker can exploit this issue through a phishing attack:

1. The attacker crafts a malicious login URL containing a controlled redirect target, for example:

``` https://victim-nocodb.example/#/signin?continueAfterSignIn=https://evil-phishing.com/fake-login ``` 2. Th…