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  <updated>2026-10-06T19:59:15.246064+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-266138</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-266138</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T19:59:15.278057+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-266138</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-266138"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22850</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-22850</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T19:59:15.278092+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Koko Analytics is an open-source analytics plugin for WordPress. Versions prior to 2.1.3 are vulnerable to arbitrary SQL execution through unescaped analytics export/import and permissive admin SQL import. Unauthenticated visitors can submit arbitrary path (`pa`) and referrer (`r`) values to the public tracking endpoint in src/Resources/functions/collect.php, which stores those strings verbatim in the analytics tables. The admin export logic in src/Admin/Data_Export.php writes these stored values directly into SQL INSERT statements without escaping. A crafted path such as "),('999','x');DROP TABLE wp_users;-- breaks out of the value list. When an administrator later imports that export file, the import handler in src/Admin/Data_Import.php reads the uploaded SQL with file_get_contents, performs only a superficial header check, splits on semicolons, and executes each statement via $wpdb-&gt;query with no validation of table names or statement types. Additionally, any authenticated user with manage_koko_analytics can upload an arbitrary .sql file and have it executed in the same permissive way. Combined, attacker-controlled input flows from the tracking endpoint into exported SQL and through the import execution sink, or directly via malicious uploads, enabling arbitrary SQL execution. In a worst-case scenario, attackers can achieve arbitrary SQL execution on the WordPress database, allowing deletion of core tables (e.g., wp_users), insertion of backdoor administrator accounts, or…</p>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-22850"/>
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