Most recent entries from all

EUVD-2026-265372

2026-10-05T22:20:37.341520+00:00

EUVD-2026-265372

fkie_cve-2026-22700

2026-10-05T22:20:37.341559+00:00

RustCrypto: Elliptic Curves is general purpose Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) support, including types and traits for representing various elliptic curve forms, scalars, points, and public/secret keys composed thereof. In versions 0.14.0-pre.0 and 0.14.0-rc.0, a denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the SM2 public-key encryption (PKE) implementation: the decrypt() path performs unchecked slice::split_at operations on input buffers derived from untrusted ciphertext. An attacker can submit short/undersized ciphertext or carefully-crafted DER-encoded structures to trigger bounds-check panics (Rust unwinding) which crash the calling thread or process. This issue has been patched via commit e60e991.

GHSA-j9xq-69pf-pcm8 — RustCrypto Has Insufficient Length Validation in decrypt() in SM2-PKE

2026-10-05T22:20:37.341596+00:00

Affected: crates.io: sm2

### Summary

A denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the SM2 public-key encryption (PKE) implementation: the `decrypt()` path performs unchecked `slice::split_at` operations on input buffers derived from untrusted ciphertext. An attacker can submit short/undersized ciphertext or carefully-crafted DER-encoded structures to trigger bounds-check panics (Rust unwinding) which crash the calling thread or process.

### Affected Component / Versions

- File: `src/pke/decrypting.rs`

- Functions: `DecryptingKey::decrypt_digest/decrypt/decrypt_der`, internal `decrypt()` implementation

- Affected releases: - sm2 0.14.0-rc.0 (https://crates.io/crates/sm2/0.14.0-rc.0) - sm2 0.14.0-pre.0 (https://crates.io/crates/sm2/0.14.0-pre.0)

### Details

The vulnerability is located in the file `sm2/src/pke/decrypting.rs`. The **fundamental cause** of the vulnerability is that the decryption function **does not strictly check** the ciphertext's format and length information. Consequently, a maliciously crafted ciphertext can trigger Rust's **panic mechanism** instead of the expected error handling (`Error`) mechanism. The Rust function `C.split_at(L)` will trigger a Panic if the length is less than `L`, as shown in the code comment below: the `decrypting` function has **at least three locations** where a slice operation might trigger a Panic.

```rust fn decrypt( secret_scalar: &Scalar, mode: Mode, hasher: &mut dyn DynDigest, cipher: &[u8], ) -> Result>…