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EUVD-2026-265378

2026-10-06T19:40:35.931676+00:00

EUVD-2026-265378

fkie_cve-2026-22699

2026-10-06T19:40:35.931715+00:00

RustCrypto: Elliptic Curves is general purpose Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) support, including types and traits for representing various elliptic curve forms, scalars, points, and public/secret keys composed thereof. In versions 0.14.0-pre.0 and 0.14.0-rc.0, a denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the SM2 PKE decryption path where an invalid elliptic-curve point (C1) is decoded and the resulting value is unwrapped without checking. Specifically, AffinePoint::from_encoded_point(&encoded_c1) may return a None/CtOption::None when the supplied coordinates are syntactically valid but do not lie on the SM2 curve. The calling code previously used .unwrap(), causing a panic when presented with such input. This issue has been patched via commit 085b7be.

GHSA-78p6-6878-8mj6 — SM2-PKE has Unchecked AffinePoint Decoding (unwrap) in decrypt()

2026-10-06T19:40:35.931763+00:00

Affected: crates.io: sm2

### Summary

A denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the SM2 PKE decryption path where an invalid elliptic-curve point (C1) is decoded and the resulting value is unwrapped without checking. Specifically, `AffinePoint::from_encoded_point(&encoded_c1)` may return a `None`/`CtOption::None` when the supplied coordinates are syntactically valid but do not lie on the SM2 curve. The calling code previously used `.unwrap()`, causing a panic when presented with such input.

### Affected Component / Versions

- File: `src/pke/decrypting.rs`

- Function: internal `decrypt()` (invoked by `DecryptingKey::decrypt*` methods)

- Affected releases:

- sm2 0.14.0-rc.0 (https://crates.io/crates/sm2/0.14.0-rc.0) - sm2 0.14.0-pre.0 (https://crates.io/crates/sm2/0.14.0-pre.0)

### Details

The library decodes the C1 field (an EC point) as an `EncodedPoint` and then converts it to an `AffinePoint` using `AffinePoint::from_encoded_point(&encoded_c1)`. That conversion returns a `CtOption` (or an `Option` equivalent) which will indicate failure when the coordinates do not satisfy the curve equation. The code then called `.unwrap()` on that result, causing a panic when `None` was returned. Because `EncodedPoint::from_bytes()` only validates format (length and SEC1 encoding) and not mathematical validity, an attacker can craft `C1 = 0x04 || X || Y` with X and Y of the right length that nonetheless do not satisfy the curve. Such inputs will pass the format check but trigger…