https://cve.radiocsirt.org/rss/recent/all/10 Most recent entries from all 2026-10-08T09:20:26.833227+00:00 Vulnerability-Lookup csirt@opendfir.org python-feedgen Contains only the most 10 recent entries. https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-265183 EUVD-2026-265183 2026-10-08T09:20:26.898481+00:00 EUVD-2026-265183 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-21885 fkie_cve-2026-21885 2026-10-08T09:20:26.898521+00:00

Miniflux 2 is an open source feed reader. Prior to version 2.2.16, Miniflux's media proxy endpoint (`GET /proxy/{encodedDigest}/{encodedURL}`) can be abused to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An authenticated user can cause Miniflux to generate a signed proxy URL for attacker-chosen media URLs embedded in feed entry content, including internal addresses (e.g., localhost, private RFC1918 ranges, or link-local metadata endpoints). Requesting the resulting `/proxy/...` URL makes Miniflux fetch and return the internal response. Version 2.2.16 fixes the issue.

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-xwh2-742g-w3wp GHSA-xwh2-742g-w3wp — Miniflux Media Proxy SSRF via /proxy endpoint allows access to internal network resources 2026-10-08T09:20:26.898557+00:00

Affected: Go: miniflux.app/v2

### Summary Miniflux's media proxy endpoint (`GET /proxy/{encodedDigest}/{encodedURL}`) can be abused to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An authenticated user can cause Miniflux to generate a signed proxy URL for attacker-chosen media URLs embedded in feed entry content, including internal addresses (e.g., localhost, private RFC1918 ranges, or link-local metadata endpoints). Requesting the resulting `/proxy/...` URL makes Miniflux fetch and return the internal response.

### Details - **Vulnerable route**: `GET /proxy/{encodedDigest}/{encodedURL}` (accessible without authentication, but requires a server-generated HMAC-signed URL) - **Handler**: `internal/ui/proxy.go` (`(*handler).mediaProxy`) - **Trigger**: entry content is rewritten to proxy media URLs (e.g., `mediaproxy.RewriteDocumentWithAbsoluteProxyURL(...)`), producing signed `/proxy/...` URLs. - **Root cause**: the proxy validates the URL scheme and HMAC signature, but does not restrict target hosts/IPs. As a result, requests to loopback/private/link-local addresses are allowed and fetched by the server.

### PoC 1) Run Miniflux 2.2.15 with default configuration (media proxy enabled by default: `MEDIA_PROXY_MODE=http-only`).

2) Log in with any normal user account.

3) Subscribe to a feed you control that contains an entry with an image URL pointing to an internal address reachable from the Miniflux server, e.g.: - `<img src="http://<internal-target>/secret">` (Note: `<internal-target>` must be reac…

 https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-21885 UBUNTU-CVE-2026-21885 2026-10-08T09:20:26.898605+00:00

Affected: Ubuntu:Pro:24.04:LTS: miniflux, Ubuntu:25.10: miniflux, Ubuntu:Pro:26.04:LTS: miniflux

Miniflux 2 is an open source feed reader. Prior to version 2.2.16, Miniflux's media proxy endpoint (`GET /proxy/{encodedDigest}/{encodedURL}`) can be abused to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). An authenticated user can cause Miniflux to generate a signed proxy URL for attacker-chosen media URLs embedded in feed entry content, including internal addresses (e.g., localhost, private RFC1918 ranges, or link-local metadata endpoints). Requesting the resulting `/proxy/...` URL makes Miniflux fetch and return the internal response. Version 2.2.16 fixes the issue.