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  <updated>2026-11-18T00:27:13.529467+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
  </author>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-266410</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-266410</title>
    <updated>2026-11-18T00:27:13.531545+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-266410</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-266410"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-20613</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-20613</title>
    <updated>2026-11-18T00:27:13.531575+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
        <p>The ArchiveReader.extractContents() function used by cctl image load and container image load performs no pathname validation before extracting an archive member. This means that a carelessly or maliciously constructed archive can extract a file into any user-writable location on the system using relative pathnames. This issue is addressed in container 0.8.0 and containerization 0.21.0.</p>
      </div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-20613"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3</id>
    <title>GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3 — Container and Containerization archive extraction does not guard against escapes from extraction base directory.</title>
    <updated>2026-11-18T00:27:13.531606+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p><strong>Affected:</strong> SwiftURL: github.com/apple/containerization, SwiftURL: github.com/apple/container</p>
<p>### Summary
The `ArchiveReader.extractContents()` function used by `cctl image load` and container image load performs no pathname validation before extracting an archive member. This means that a carelessly or maliciously constructed archive can extract a file into any user-writable location on the system using relative pathnames.</p>
<p>### Details</p>
<p>The code in question is: https://github.com/apple/containerization/blob/main/Sources/ContainerizationArchive/Reader.swift#L180.</p>
<p>```swift
    /// Extracts the contents of an archive to the provided directory.
    /// Currently only handles regular files and directories present in the archive.
    public func extractContents(to directory: URL) throws {
        let fm = FileManager.default
        var foundEntry = false
        for (entry, data) in self {
            guard let p = entry.path else { continue }
            foundEntry = true
            let type = entry.fileType
            let target = directory.appending(path: p)
            switch type {
            case .regular:
                try data.write(to: target, options: .atomic)
            case .directory:
                try fm.createDirectory(at: target, withIntermediateDirectories: true)
            case .symbolicLink:
                guard let symlinkTarget = entry.symlinkTarget, let linkTargetURL = URL(string: symlinkTarget, relativeTo: target) else {
                    continue
                }
                try fm.createSymbolicLink(at: target, withDestinationUR…</p></div>
    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3"/>
  </entry>
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