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  <updated>2026-10-09T22:39:08.516264+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-384964</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-384964</title>
    <updated>2026-10-09T22:39:08.517868+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-384964</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-384964"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-19571</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-19571</title>
    <updated>2026-10-09T22:39:08.517903+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
      <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The ITE IT8xxx2 SHI host-command backend (subsys/mgmt/ec_host_cmd/backends/ec_host_cmd_backend_shi_ite.c) copied the 8-byte host-command request header from the SPI Rx FIFO directly into the shared receive buffer data-&gt;in_msg and only afterwards checked the protocol version and the derived packet length. The interrupt handler also accepted a chip-select assertion and an Rx-valid-length (RVLI) interrupt in any driver state other than SHI_STATE_DISABLED, so a new header could be parsed while the host-command thread was still processing the previous request out of the very same buffer.</p>
<p>The host processor is the SPI controller and drives both chip select and the clock. After sending a well-formed request it can immediately de-assert chip select — which returns the driver to the ready state and re-enables the FIFO — and start a second transaction carrying a header with data_len = 0xFFFF. Those eight bytes are written into in_msg before the oversized length is rejected, so they land in a buffer whose contents verify_rx() in subsys/mgmt/ec_host_cmd/ec_host_cmd_handler.c has already validated. If this lands in the window before the host-command thread executes args.input_buf_size = rx_header-&gt;data_len, the framework hands the registered command handler a 65535-byte input length over a 256-byte buffer.</p>
<p>The result is an out-of-bounds read of up to roughly 64 KiB beyond the request buffer: command handlers that copy or echo input_buf_size bytes disclose adjacent embedded-controller m…</p></div>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-19571"/>
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