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  <updated>2026-10-06T12:18:20.055630+00:00</updated>
  <author>
    <name>Vulnerability-Lookup</name>
    <email>csirt@opendfir.org</email>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-341147</id>
    <title>EUVD-2026-341147</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T12:18:20.107006+00:00</updated>
    <content>EUVD-2026-341147</content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/euvd-2026-341147"/>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-17534</id>
    <title>fkie_cve-2026-17534</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T12:18:20.107060+00:00</updated>
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        <p>Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.</p>
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    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-17534"/>
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  <entry>
    <id>https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-28vq-345c-25gg</id>
    <title>GHSA-28vq-345c-25gg</title>
    <updated>2026-10-06T12:18:20.107116+00:00</updated>
    <content type="xhtml">
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        <p>Kimi Code (@moonshot-ai/kimi-code) before 0.27.0 implements FetchURL SSRF hardening as a static hostname and IP-literal denylist in assertSafeFetchTarget, without resolving DNS or re-validating hosts after HTTP redirects. An attacker who can influence a FetchURL call (for example via prompt injection) can supply a crafted public hostname that resolves to loopback or another internal address, or a public URL that redirects to such a target, and thereby reach internal network services that the denylist was intended to block. FetchURL is included in the default auto-approve tool set, so the call does not require interactive user confirmation in manual mode.</p>
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    </content>
    <link href="https://cve.radiocsirt.org/vuln/ghsa-28vq-345c-25gg"/>
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